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Abstract:
In philosophy of mind, desire is an also-ran when it comes to theorizing about
mental states - all the attention is on belief, (visual) perceptual experience, and
pain. Desire is largely ignored, as it is assumed to be similar enough to belief that
one can simply focus on belief, in forming theories of belief and desire. Here I
address two areas where I see this assumption as a particular problem.
One is in the metaphysics of desire. It has not been recognized that we might
have conflicting behavioral dispositions because of an over-focus on mental states
that are usually held together coherently: beliefs. Desires, unlike beliefs, are often
held together although they conflict; I can both want to have coffee because I love
the taste, and also want to refrain because I want to sleep. I argue in chapter 1, for
reasons independent of philosophy of mind, that an object can have conflicting
dispositions. I then apply this in chapter 2 to argue that having conflicting desires
involves having conflicting behavioral dispositions.
It is also usually assumed that the first-personal epistemology of belief and desire
will be roughly the same. Given this, there have been attempts to extend a
promising account of introspection for belief to desire, and I address this in chapter
3. On this account, we know our beliefs by looking out towards the belief's
content, without turning inwards to our own mind. I know I believe there is coffee
in the cupboard by thinking about the cupboard, and concluding that there is coffee
inside. Those who have extended this to desire claim that to know whether I want
something, I look out to the world, fixing my attention on the potential object of
desire, and ignoring my own mind. I think that although we must of course attend
in thought to the object of desire, we also keep one eye on ourselves. The
epistemology of desire is unlike that of belief in that we must measure how wefeel -
to know what we want, our attention is be split between our own minds and the
world.
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In philosophy of mind, desire is an also-ran when it comes to theorizing about
mental states - all the attention is on belief, (visual) perceptual experience, with
some pain thrown in for good measure. The general attitude towards desire seems
to be: whatever goes for belief, goes for desire, with only minor modifications to
accommodate a few differences. Belief and desire are supposedly similar enough
that one can focus on belief and mostly ignore desire, in order to get a theory of
belief and desire.
One area where this over focus on belief causes problems is in the metaphysics of
the mind. Philosophers of mind have not seen that we might have conflicting
behavioral dispositions because they have centered their attention on a set of mental
states that are usually held together coherently: beliefs. Desires, unlike beliefs, are
very often held together even though they conflict. Having conflicting desires, I
argue, is one way of having conflicting dispositions. However, it has been suggested
recently that objects cannot have conflicting dispositions, and this poses a problem
for understanding desire conflict in terms of dispositional conflict. So before
turning to the case of desire, I argue in chapter 1, for reasons independent of the
philosophy of mind, that an object can have conflicting dispositions.
It is relatively old news that an object can have a disposition and yet fail to
manifest it when in appropriate stimulus conditions. Dispositional ascriptions do
not entail the counterfactuals we might expect, as interfering factors may be poised
to prevent the disposition from manifesting in its very stimulus conditions. Such
factors are commonly called finks and masks. While the existence of finks and masks
is generally accepted, it has recently been called into question whether finks and
masks may be intrinsic to the disposition bearer. It has been suggested that if an
intrinsic property of the object would prevent a particular response in certain
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conditions, then the object fails to have the corresponding disposition. This means
that, insofar as the dispositions concerned are intrinsic, an object cannot have
conflicting dispositions.
The claim that there cannot be intrinsic finks or masks has been wielded, in some
cases explicitly and in others implicitly, against, for example: dispositional theories
of rule following, of the ability to do otherwise, and of perceptual content. This
problem is not isolated, however, to these three dispositional theories - it is a
problem that threatens, in general, dispositional analyses of mental states. In
particular, it threatens some appealing dispositional analyses of desire.
In chapter 2, I discuss how the possibility of intrinsic finks and masks would
affect such analyses. It is thought that a single desire or belief, considered on its
own, does not dispose us to behave in a particular way, but only together as part of
an entire mental state system do they point towards any particular behavior - the
impossibility of giving a behavioral analysis of a particular mental state in isolation
was one of the things that supposedly led to the downfall of behaviorism. There has
been an over-zealous reaction to this, however, in a move to a certain kind of
holism concerning how our mental states determine our behavioral dispositions - a
view that stems, in part, from the thought that an object's own dispositions cannot
conflict. I argue that we can and should reject this holism. It rests on an overly
simple view of dispositions and how they can interact, and on a faulty assumption
that the general structure of what goes for belief, goes for desire.
I propose a view on which desires, though they act in concert with beliefs to
dispose us to act in particular ways, do not have to also act in concert with other
desires. In particular, they do not act in concert with conflicting desires, and this very
fact helps account for the phenomenology of desire conflict. My picture has the
further advantage of being able to account for an intuitive difference between the
way our desires depend on our beliefs for how we act in virtue of having those
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desires, and the way in which our acting to satisfy a desire is dependent on the
existence of other desires.
In theories concerning our introspective access to our own mental states, there
has also been an over-focus on belief. Moreover, usually theories of self-knowledge
provide the same basic account for knowledge of our beliefs and desires (when they
look at desire at all). The account is always developed for belief and desire is
generally given a quick, rough treatment without much thought for how belief and
desire might be different. In chapter 3, I evaluate some slightly more detailed
attempts to extend a particular promising type of account of self-knowledge for
belief to the case of desire.
A plausible and widely held account of introspection for beliefs holds that beliefs
are known via a method that involves looking out to the world - towards the
belief's content - instead of turning inwards to look for an inner state of the mind.
On this view, I know that I believe that there is coffee in the cupboard by thinking
about the cupboard, and concluding that there is coffee inside. Outward-looking
accounts like this supposedly dispense with the need to posit some special faculty via
which we know our own minds - they are economical in the sense that the method
via which we know our mental states utilizes only faculties that we already need to
posit in order to explain how we know the non-mental world.
This sort of account was originally proposed as a theory about how we know our
beliefs, but there have been some recent attempts to extend this idea to provide an
account of our introspective knowledge of our desires. Thus, this extension would
have it, I don't look inwards towards my mental states in order to know what I
want, but instead I look out to the world, and fix my attention on the potential
object of desire in order to work out whether I want it.
If this type of theory about how we know our desires were correct, this would
be a step towards an uniform and economical theory of self-knowledge. We would
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know our beliefs and desires in a roughly similar way, and we would not need to
posit any special faculties via which we know these mental states. However, I think
they are not successful. I look at two types of outward looking accounts of
introspection for desire. One appeals to our judgments of value as part of the method
via which we introspectively know our desires. This type of account faces two
challenges from our commonsense ideas about how desires and values hook up.
Firstly, it needs to account for (or explain away) cases where we know (via
introspection) that we don't desire something, yet we judge it valuable. Secondly,
it also needs to account for (or explain away) cases where we know (via
introspection) that we desire something, yet we don't judge it to be valuable. I
argue that these cases are not successfully dealt with by any account that appeals to
value judgments. I develop a second kind of outward looking account that instead
involves something akin to perception of value. This account has the advantage of
being able to deal with cases where our value judgments and our judgments of what
we desire come apart. However, the account still faces considerable problems -
firstly, it obscures the difference between wanting and liking. Secondly, it does not
fit well with results concerning early childhood theory of mind. Thus the prospects
for an outward looking account of our introspective access to our desires do not
look good. I think that although we must, in looking for what we want, of course
attend in thought to the object of desire, we also have to keep one eye on ourselves.
The epistemology of desire is unlike that of belief in that we have to measure how
wefeel about an option or object in order to know whether we have the desire - and
how we feel about something cannot be discovered by merely looking outwards.
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Chapter 1: Superficial Dispositionalism
It is old news, relatively speaking, that an object can have a disposition - a glass may
be fragile, say - without it being the case that it would manifest that disposition
under suitable conditions - without it being the case that the glass would break if
struck. A sorcerer may be standing by, ready to prevent fracture lines from
forming.1 Although the presence of the sorcerer falsifies the counterfactual we
associate with fragility, it does not falsify the attribution offragility to the vase.
However, it has been claimed that this holds only for extrinsic dispositional
interference; if the potentially interfering property is intrinsic to the object then, on
this view, the dispositional attribution is also falsified. This leads to a conception of
dispositions as superficial properties of objects, which cannot be hidden by other
intrinsic properties:
Superficial Dispositionalism (SD): If an object x has a disposition D(M,S) -
a disposition to give manifestation-response M under stimulus conditions S -
then there is no intrinsic property of x that would prevent x from M-ing if x
were to undergo S.2
1 See (Johnston 1992: 231-3), (Martin 1994: 2-4), and (Bird 1998: 228) for counterexamples to
the claim that dispositional ascriptions entail their associated counterfactuals.
2 I do not mean to imply that every dispositional ascription is equivalent to some single-track
overt dispositional ascription: -disposed to M if S-. See (Bird 2007: 18-24) for discussion of the
difficulties of translating covert dispositional predicates like "fragile" to ones overtly concerning
stimulus-manifestation pairs. Although there may be no single stimulus-manifestation pair for a
particular disposition, the type of dispositional interference considered here only requires the
falsification of one associated counterfactual: if x were to undergo S, then x would M. Though
fragility-ascriptions may not be equivalent to the disposition-ascription disposed to break if struck,
SD is meant to rule out the possibility of fragile glasses not breaking when struck, due to some
intrinsic property. Also, note that throughout this dissertation I will slide between using the
schematic letter "M" in place of a noun and in place of a verb - treat to M- and to give
response M' equivalently.
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This claim has been wielded, in some cases explicitly and in others implicitly,
against various dispositional theories of mind. Superficial Dispositionalism lies
behind, for example, rejections of dispositional solutions to the rule-following
problem, of dispositional theories of the ability to do otherwise, and of dispositional
theories of perceptual content. Dispositional solutions to Kripkean rule-following
problems such as given by Martin and Heil (1998) have been rejected by Handfield
and Bird (2008) because they rely on the possibility of intrinsic dispositional
interference. Michael Smith (2005) proposes that agents in Frankfurt-style cases' do
not lack the ability to do otherwise, as we can think of abilities as dispositional, and
Frankfurt-style cases as involving dispositional interference. Agents can have
dispositions even though they could not manifest them, due to interfering factors, so
likewise agents can have abilities even if something interferes with them. Cohen
and Handfield (2007) claim against this that because some of the important
Frankfurt cases involve intrinsic interference, "...the ability to do otherwise, if it is
thought to support judgments of responsibility - cannot be analyzed dispositionally"
(2007: 372). If SD is true, dispositions cannot help us, as Smith thinks, to mark out
the difference between free action, compulsive action, and weakness of will.
Armstrong's (1961) dispositional analysis of the content of perception - slightly
simplified, that the content of your perceptual experience is what you are disposed
to believe upon having that perception - faces a similar problem. Where I know
that there is an illusion, say if faced with some Miiller-Lyer lines, you might think
I'm not disposed to believe that things are the way they appear. After all, since I am
aware of their illusory nature, I don't believe upon seeing the lines that they are of
3 Frankfurt-style cases are ones in which an agent appears not to be able to do otherwise, but they
are still acting freely. For example: a person may, of their own free will, decide not to help
someone in need, even though had they been about to decide otherwise, a cunning
neuroscientist would interfere in such a way as to prevent them from making that decision. See
(Frankfurt 1969).
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different lengths. Any attempt to appeal to finks and masks to avoid this problem
will fail, according to the supporter of SD, as the interfering factors here are
intrinsic.
Showing how these dispositional theories might be rehabilitated if we reject SD
is work for another time - although in chapter 2 I will discuss how accepting
intrinsic finking and masking improves prospects for dispositional analyses of desire.
In this chapter, my aim is simply to show that SD is false. Dispositions are not
superficial properties of objects; they can be hidden from view if other properties,
intrinsic or extrinsic, interfere with their manifestation.
To motivate this, here are some preliminary examples. A berry could be
poisonous, although due to its indigestible skin it is prevented from having a
poisonous effect on those who ingest it. An intrinsic property of the berry - its
having an indigestible skin - prevents the berry from having its noxious effect.
When it is skinned, it is not that the berry becomes poisonous - its disposition to
harm those that ingest it is simply unmasked. Poisonousness is not a new disposition
that the berry didn't have before. The lenses in a pair of spectacles might be
transparent - yet upon exposure to light, turn non-transparent in virtue of the way
the lenses are intrinsically. 4
In section 1 I will give a more extensive introduction to dispositions and
dispositional interference, including the idea that paradigmatic dispositions are
intrinsic properties of objects. In section 2 I will recount the argument for
Superficial Dispositionalism, which rests on the idea that dispositions are intrinsic to
their bearers. I provide several counterexamples to SD in section 3. I also argue
4 Photochromatic lenses work somewhat like this, although they work in response to UV rather
than just visible light. For this case, simply imagine super-photochromatic lenses that, instead
of turning dark upon UV exposure, turn dark upon the assault of any amount of any kind of
light. Note that photochromatic lenses are different from polarized lenses, which do not
themselves change in response to light, but only let through light waves of certain orientations.
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that general features of dispositions - features that are widely accepted - in fact
require us to reject SD. I do this firstly by showing that arguments for the existence
of extrinsic finking and masking also apply to cases of intrinsic dispositional
interference. This means that the acceptance of SD throws doubt on the standard
defenses of the possibility of extrinsic dispositional interference without loss of the
disposition in question. I also argue that SD conflicts with the claim that
paradigmatic dispositions are intrinsic. Since the primary argument for SD relies on
this, SD is left without support.
In section 4 I turn to some objections to my arguments. I discuss two main lines
of response: firstly, that my arguments show that a disposition's relation to its
bearer as intrinsic or extrinsic can vary - one glass may have its fragility
intrinsically, while another may be fragile only extrinsically. The second main
objection I address claims that my cases turn on a confusion of the dispositions of
parts fot dispositions of the whole. This second objection, I claim, itself rests on
confusing properties and parts.
1.0 Introducing Dispositions, Finks and Masks
Suppose someone didn't understand what we meant by our dispositional terms,
words like "fragility", or "elasticity". It would be natural to explain the meanings of
those terms by citing the responses that objects with those dispositional properties
would have to being in certain conditions. The glass is fragile, so it would break if it
were struck. The band is elastic, so it would stretch if pulled and relax if let go. It
isn't necessary that the glass actually be struck and break for it to be fragile, and the
band need never actually be stretched to be elastic. In general, the object need
never actually be in the disposition's stimulus conditions (and so need never
manifest the disposition) in order to have the disposition in question. Dispositional
terms in some sense concern what would happen under particular conditions -
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conditions that may not actually obtain. Dispositional ascriptions therefore clearly
have some kind of intimate relationship with counterfactuals.
Once upon a time it was thought that this relationship was reductive -
dispositional ascriptions were thought to be equivalent to counterfactuals
concerning what would happen in the disposition's stimulus conditions. The truth
conditions of "the glass is fragile" were thought to be equivalent to the truth
conditions of some counterfactual like, "the glass would break if it were struck".
Generalizing, we have:
Simple Counterfactual Analysis of Dispositions: An object x has
disposition D(M,S) iff x would produce manifestation M if x were to undergo
stimulus conditions S.
However, it turns out that none of the stimulus-response counterfactuals that we
naturally associate with dispositions like fragility or elasticity are entailed by that
disposition's ascription. The analysis fails in the right-to-left direction s as well,
though I will focus here on the failure of the left-to-right direction. Some glass may
not shatter if dropped, because a guardian angel watches over it, ready to whisk it
off to safety before the glass can break - yet it may still be true that the glass is
fragile - it is still true that it has a disposition which involves responding to dropping
events with shattering events. Interfering factors can make the associated
counterfactual false, even though it is still true that the object has the disposition.
In general, although an object may be disposed to give response M under
conditions S, it may be that were x to be put into conditions S, x would not M,
because of either afink or a mask. A fink is a property that would remove the
5 See (Smith 1977: 440), (Johnston 1992: 231-2), and (Martin 1994: 2-3).
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disposition to M under conditions S, and so falsifies the counterfactual naturally
associated with the disposition - yet, despite this, the dispositional ascription is true
(at least prior to the object undergoing conditions S).
Fink: A fink for a disposition D(M,S), where D(M,S) is had by an object x, is a
property had by x that would prevent x from M-ing in S by removing the
disposition D(M,S) should x undergo S.
For example, a wire has the disposition to conduct electricity if a charge is applied
to it - yet a wire could be attached to a device that reliably senses when a charge is
about to be applied to the wire, and would cause the wire to become dead should it
ever be in those circumstances.' The device (or, more precisely, the property of
having the device attached) is a fink for the wire's conductivity. A fink falsifies the
counterfactual associated with a disposition by being such that it would remove the
disposition before the disposition can manifest.
In contrast, a mask7 is a property that interferes, not by removing the disposition
should the object undergo the stimulus conditions for that disposition (as a fink
does), but instead by interfering with the manifestation of the disposition (whilst not
removing the disposition).
6 See (Martin 1994: 3-4) for this example.
7 See (Johnston 1992: 233). Alexander Bird (1998) instead calls this kind of property an
"antidote". This is potentially confusing, as an antidote can work in (at least) two different
ways. An antidote for a poison might block the poison's ability to be absorbed by the
poisonee's body, in which case it would mask the poison's disposition - but it might also work
by removing the poison's disposition to kill, in which case it would be a fink. Both are perfectly
good as an antidote. Bird notes that there is a difference between what he calls the philosophical
use of "antidote", and the ordinary use. The ordinary use of the word "mask", however, implies
that what is masked - in this case, the disposition - is not removed or altered.
PAGE 16 OF 95
Mask: A mask for a disposition D(M,S), where D(M,S) is had by an object x, is
a property had by x that would prevent x from M-ing in S without removing the
disposition D(M,S) should x undergo S.
Glasses, even when packed in bubble-wrap, are fragile - they have the dispositional
propertyfragility - but they will not break when dropped, if cushioned sufficiently.
The careful packing is a mask for the disposition to break when struck.
1.1 The Intrinsic Nature of Dispositions
Why not think that the simple counterfactual analysis is true, and we're just
mistaken that the glass and wire have these dispositions in these circumstances? One
reason for upholding the possibility of finks and masks is that, as Lewis claims,
"dispositions are an intrinsic matter" (1997: 147), where the concept of intrinsicality
in play is relative to the natural laws governing the behaviour of the object.'
Dispositional properties are intrinsic 9 properties; nomological duplicates -
duplicates under the same laws - could not differ in their dispositions.
Strictly speaking, not all dispositional predicates pick out intrinsic properties.
Examples of extrinsic dispositions have been given by Jennifer McKitrick (2003:
8 In this paper I am using the idea of intrinsicality most often found in the literature on
dispositions - a property P is intrinsic to an object x (at world w) iff P is had by all of x's
duplicates in worlds that have the same natural laws as w. This corresponds to a notion of
intrinsicality that is referred to as "Kim+-intrinsic" in (Humberstone 1996: 238). What I say
here is not meant to turn on a particular way of defining duplication, but see (Langton and
Lewis 1998: 336-7) for one definition of duplication: they define duplicates as those that share
basic intrinsic properties, which are properties that are 1) independent of loneliness or
accompaniment, 2) not disjunctive properties and 3) not negations of disjunctive properties.
9 Note that dispositions aren't automatically extrinsic simply because we often use their
stimulus/manifestation pair - which are generally extrinsic to the object - to pick out the
disposition that we are referring to. Conceptual relationality concerns concepts, not properties
directly. Dispositions may be conceptually relational (requiring reference to relations the
object has to other extrinsic matters in order to specify the concept of the disposition), but, for
all that, intrinsic.
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159-63), and Stephen Yablo (1999: 611). For example, McKitrick argues that
vulnerability is an extrinsic disposition; Yablo points out that weight is an extrinsic
disposition to exert a downwards force. A rabbit's vulnerability is dependent on
whether anything around could harm it; my weight is dependent on the strength of
the gravitational field I find myself in. Since whether an object has these dispositions
depends on matters extrinsic to it, the disposition is extrinsic. However, the
standardly cited dispositions - for short, the paradigmatic dispositions - such as
fragility, solubility, elasticity, and conductivity, are plausibly intrinsic.
Paradigmatic Intrinsic Dispositions thesis: Paradigmatic dispositions are
intrinsic to their bearers; that is, for these dispositions D(M,S), if an object x is a
nomic duplicate of an object y, and y has paradigmatic disposition D(M,S), then
x has disposition D(M,S).
The dispositions of the vase aren't altered by external packaging - it is stillfragile -
this is part of the explanation for why it is packed so carefully. If we attribute this
disposition to unpacked vases, it should also be attributed to duplicate vases that just
happen to be packed - because fragility is intrinsic. 10 Perhaps we would not
attribute fragility to the vase/packing combination, but the vase itself does not lose
its fragility just by gaining the extrinsic property of being protected by bubble-wrap.
Similarly, the wire, before the current is applied, has a disposition to conduct -
despite the presence of the finking device. The mere presence of the device, while
10 Note that, depending on what one thinks about the modal status of natural laws, there may be
another intrinsic/extrinsic distinction that I am not appealing to. If the natural laws are
contingent, then one might think there is a notion of intrinsic simpliciter, where a property is
intrinsic if it is shared by any duplicate whatsoever (though if the laws are necessary then these
two distinctions collapse into each other). Then dispositions may be extrinsic in this sense.
However, this is not the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction that is in play in the dispositions
literature.
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dormant, does not remove the wire's disposition to conduct (although, of course,
once it senses an impending charge-application, it will remove this disposition).
The thesis that (nomological) duplication preserves (for these paradigmatic
cases) dispositional structure is often appealed to in order to defend the claim that
there are counterexamples to the simple counterfactual analysis of dispositions.
We think that a disposition can be extrinsically finked and masked - that such
interference doesn't falsify the ascription of the disposition - because some
duplicates of the object clearly manifest the disposition when in the disposition's
stimulus conditions. In order for there to be clear counterexamples to the simple
counterfactual analysis of dispositions, we do not need to claim that all dispositions
are intrinsic. Yet so long as some dispositions are intrinsic, we can appeal to the
clear possession of those dispositions by duplicates to establish that an object has the
disposition, even though the disposition's associated counterfactual is false due to
either finks or masks. The truth of the paradigmatic intrinsic dispositions thesis
(hereafter, simply "the intrinsic dispositions thesis") is therefore very important to
the possibility of establishing that there are finks or masks at all. As we will see in
the next section, the assumption that dispositions are intrinsic to their bearers also
lies behind SD itself.
2.0 The Case for Superficial Dispositionalism
To show the plausibility of SD, Handfield and Bird take a traditional finkish example
from the literature - an example of an extrinsic fink - and imagine that instead of the
interference coming from the outside, it comes from a source intrinsic to the object.
Suppose Lewis's sorcerer, protecting the fragile glass, decided that, to be on the
11 See (Choi 2003). For an example of this put to work, see (Bird 2007: 24-5)
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safe side, he would enchant the glass in such a way that it has an intrinsic
property which would cause it, when struck, to lose the molecular structure
which, under normal circumstances, is the causal basis of fragility... The glass, if
struck, would not break, because of the enchantment. It seems plausible to say
that such a glass is simply not fragile. It has lost the disposition of fragility
because it has lost its intrinsic causal basis for fragility. This loss of the causal
basis has occurred not by removing the molecular structure, but by adding another
intrinsic property - the enchantment - which we do not typically associate with
the molecular structure of glass (Handfield and Bird 2008: 290). 12
The fact that an intrinsic property - the enchantment - would be responsible for the
failure of the disposition to manifest is, according to the Superficial
Dispositionalists, enough to falsify the dispositional ascription of fragility to the
glass.
The problem with this way of arguing is that, of course, the defender of the
possibility of intrinsic finking and masking needn't hold that all dispositions could be
intrinsically finked or masked. It may be that some dispositional ascriptions pick out
properties that are superficial in this way, and these sorts of dispositions could not be
intrinsically finked or masked. Although I think that fragility is not superficial in this
way, and will argue for this in the following section, for all I've said thus far
Handfield and Bird could be correct in claiming that fragility is superficial. Yet this
does not imply that SD is true. 13
12 The case referred to in this quotation comes from (Lewis 1997: 147). A sorcerer finkishly
protects a glass by standing by, ready to cast a spell that will change the glass's micro-structure
to a non-fragile one, should the glass ever be struck.
13 I take it that Handfield and Bird's intention in giving this example is not so much to argue
decisively for SD, as to merely give it some plausibility - though this might be questioned given
that following this discussion they say, "We can conclude therefore that as regards both fink and
antidote cases if S contains an intrinsic fink or antidote to some disposition D, then S does not
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As a global hypothesis about dispositions, any argumentfor SD would have to be
grounded in general features of dispositions, and not just in features of isolated
cases. Choi (2005) attempts such an argument, based on how we make
dispositional ascriptions. According to Choi, there are two tests that guide our
dispositional ascriptions to objects. Suppose we're wondering whether an object x,
in a world w, has a particular (intrinsic) disposition. We first apply the nomic
duplicate test, which comes in two parts:
1) Are there any nomic duplicates of x - any duplicates of x in worlds
governed by the same laws as w - that clearly possess the disposition in
question?
2) Are there any nomic duplicates of x that clearly do not possess the
disposition?
If the answer to the first question is yes, and the second question is either
unanswerable or answered in the negative, then x has the disposition in question; if
the answer to the second question is yes, and there is either a negative answer or no
answer at all to the first, then x does not have the disposition. If there is a "yes"
answer to both questions, the disposition must be extrinsic, and the tests are not
meant to apply. If the nomic duplicate test fails to give a clear answer either way
then Choi claims that we fall back on the conditional test: if the object were to be in
conditions S, would it give response M? If so, then the object has the disposition
D(M,S).
The tests do seem to suggest that an object could not have a disposition that is
interfered with by an intrinsic property, for the following reason. Take an object
possess D" (Handfield and Bird 2008: 291).
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which has an intrinsic property that would prevent the object from M-ing were it to
undergo conditions S. Since the interfering property is intrinsic, it appears that (by
the nomic duplicate test) no duplicate would clearly possess14 the disposition
D(M,S), because all nomic duplicates will have the interfering property. In order to
clearly possess the disposition, one might think, it is necessary that the duplicate be
able to manifest the disposition - and since all duplicates will have the intrinsic
interferer, it seems that they can't." If we are forced to fall back on the conditional
test, we must conclude that the original object does not have the disposition, since
the interfering property makes the associated counterfactual false. 16
Choi's tests rely on the intrinsic dispositions thesis, and the tests are given in
support of SD. However, as I will argue in the following sections, there are
counterexamples to SD that can only be avoided by denying the intrinsic dispositions
thesis.
3.0 The Case against Superficial Dispositionalism
In this section I will show that SD is untenable by drawing attention to several
counterexamples. Arguments designed to establish the possibility of extrinsic finking
and masking apply equally well to cases of intrinsic finking and masking. Moreover,
as I will explain later, SD causes problems for the (paradigmatic) intrinsic
dispositions thesis. The defense of SD therefore undermines not only the possibility
of any kind of finking and masking, but since Choi's argument rests on the intrinsic
dispositions thesis, these examples also show that this argument for SD is self-
undermining.
14 Though Choi does not clarify what it is to clearly possess the disposition in question, I assume
that being able to manifest the disposition in the disposition's stimulus conditions is what is
required.
15 In fact, they can - as I will argue this in section 3.3.
16 However see (Clarke 2007: 3-4) for an argument that Choi's tests give contradictory results in
the case of intrinsic finks which have been extrinsically disabled.
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First, however, I will provide some motivating examples. I will begin with the
familiar. There is a case in the dispositions literature, due to Mark Johnston (1992:
231), which is actually a case of intrinsic finking, on the supposition that colours are
dispositional properties: 17
An Intrinsic Fink (Blushing Chameleon): A chameleon may be green, yet be so shy
(and remarkably intuitive) that it would blush bright red if someone were about
to view it. While in the dark the chameleon is green, it loses this disposition -
this disposition is finked - should it enter into a viewing situation. The
disposition associated with greenness is lost in virtue of interference from
properties intrinsic to the chameleon - its shyness, intuitiveness, and ability to
blush.
We can also modify this case to get one in which the chameleon's greenness is
masked:
An Intrinsic Mask (Sweaty Chameleon): Instead of blushing, the shy intuitive
chameleon might sweat bright red sweat should it be about to be viewed. The
red sweat hides the chameleon's green skin from view, but the chameleon is
still green underneath. The properties of the chameleon that are responsible
for the masking of its greenness - its shyness, intuitiveness, and ability to sweat
- are all intrinsic properties of the chameleon, so we have an intrinsic mask.
Although it is intuitively clear that the chameleon is green - despite the falsity of
17 This was originally given simply as a case of finking, not particularly as an example of intrinsic
finking. The fact that the shy intuitive chameleon is a case of intrinsic finking has been
independently pointed out by Clarke (2007: 2).
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the counterfactual: it would look green if viewed - you might take these examples to
show that colour is not dispositional in the way Johnston thinks. 18 However, we
can construct other examples, with the same structure, for properties that are
clearly dispositional.
To see this we return to Handfield and Bird's intrinsically enchanted glass.
Intuitions on this case, according to Handfield and Bird, rule that the glass is no
longer fragile, once enchanted. Instead, as Handfield says elsewhere, it would "have
an odd form of non-fragility" (Handfield 2008: 300). However, once we flesh out
some possible ways in which the enchantment could prevent the glass from
breaking, we can get a clear case of an intrinsic mask, for a property that is
undeniably dispositional. My first case involving fragility is structurally similar to
Sweaty Chameleon.
An Intrinsic Mask (Magic Wrap): Imagine that the sorcerer enchants the glass so
that the enchantment causes bubble-wrap to appear around the glass, should the
glass be about to be struck, in time to save the glass from shattering. The glass,
therefore, would not break if struck.
The source of the potential interference is an intrinsic property of the glass - the
enchantment. In the next section I will explain how strategies for defending the
existence of extrinsic finks and masks also support Magic Wrap as an example of an
intrinsic mask.
18 This is Handfield's response (personal correspondence).
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3.1 SD Conflicts with Arguments for Extrinsic Finking and Masking
Could one insist that the glass in Magic Wrap is no longer fragile, once enchanted in
this way? Though I think it is intuitively clear that the glass is still fragile, someone
might maintain otherwise. But if they do, consequences will have to be faced - as
the reasons why we should think there is extrinsic finking and masking also apply to
cases where the interference is instead intrinsic.
In the ordinary case of masked fragility, the non-enchanted glass is fragile even
though it would not break if struck, due to being carefully encased in bubble-wrap.
One reason given for why we should think this is because (according to some of the
Superficial Dispositionalists) its fragility figures in the best explanation of the role
the bubble-wrap plays. Bird suggests this type of explanation for why a vase that is
(extrinsically) protected by a sorcerer should be considered fragile even though it
would not break if struck: "After all it is natural to say that the sorcerer is concerned
to protect his vase because it is so fragile" (Bird 2007: 30).
A competing explanation is that the vase would be fragile if not protected - the
sorcerer, on this alternative explanation, is concerned to protect his vase because
without his protection it would be fragile. Why not instead take this would befragile
explanation?
One reason is that we are looking to explain the role the protector plays. The
sorcerer protects the vase, preventing it from breaking. Ordinary bubble-wrap
protects ordinary glasses, preventing them from breaking. In Magic Wrap, the
bubble-wrap prevents the (enchanted) glassfrom breaking, in much the same way as it
would prevent ordinary glassesfrom breaking.
If the enchanted glass is not fragile, it seems strange that it needs to be wrapped
to prevent it from breaking. But it is worth noting that things are not completely
straightforward - non-fragile things sometimes must be wrapped to prevent them
from breaking. Take an iron nail - quite non-fragile. But imagine this: the nail,
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wrapped in bubble-wrap, is immersed in a canister of liquid nitrogen, which is being
constantly shaken. If the nail were not wrapped, it would break, as the liquid
nitrogen would render it fragile and it would break when it hits the side of the
container. The wrap protects the nail from breaking, and yet the nail is not fragile.
The supporter of SD will think that the situation with the nail and the situation
with the glass in Magic Wrap are similar in that both are preventedfrom being fragile.
In the first case, the bubble-wrap prevents the nail from becoming fragile through
contact with the liquid nitrogen, and in the second the enchantment prevents the
glass from being fragile (as it would be if not enchanted). But careful consideration
of the dissimilarities here will in fact lend support to the denial of SD.
The important difference is that the bubble-wrap in Magic Wrap prevents the glass
from breaking in exactly the same way that bubble-wrap prevents normal glasses from
breaking. The nail, on the other hand, is protected by being prevented from
undergoing changes that would render it fragile. If the protection afforded by the
bubble-wrap is the same for both the enchanted and unenchanted glass, the fragility
of the unenchanted glass gives us good reason to think that the enchanted glass is
also fragile. The best explanation of the role of the protection in both cases appeals
to the fragility of the glass - not just for why the protection is needed to prevent
breaking, but also to explain the similarity of the method of protection.
The alternative would-be-fragile explanation, if it applies to the glass in Magic
Wrap, should also apply to the ordinary wrapped glass. For the only difference here
is the cause of the wrapping; the protective wrap plays the same role in both cases.
If the protected but non-enchanted glass does not remain fragile when wrapped,
then we lose a paradigmatic example of an extrinsic mask, and so it seems we should
be suspicious as to whether masking of dispositions is possible at all.
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3.2 Is the Mask Intrinsic?
I will briefly canvas two possible objections to Magic Wrap as an example of intrinsic
masking before moving to further problems with SD. The general form of both the
objections is this: the mask in Magic Wrap is not really intrinsic. I will consider two
reasons you might think this. Firstly, although the enchantment is intrinsic, the
bubble-wrap that it brings into existence, and which ultimately prevents the
breaking, isn't. The second version of the objection turns on the worry that our
intuitions are confused by the magical nature of the enchantment - and we don't
really have a good grasp on what it is for an enchantment to be intrinsic.
In reply to the first version of the worry, note that a mask or fink is not
necessarily the most proximal cause of the disposition failing to manifest. If this
were the case, then any fink of an intrinsic disposition would be intrinsic - for the
proximal cause of an object failing to manifest an intrinsic disposition in a standard
finking case is a change in the object's intrinsic nature - the loss of the intrinsic
disposition. A fink or mask for a disposition D(M,S) had by an object x at a time is
instead a property had by the object at that time and which would be responsible for
x failing to M if x were to undergo stimulus conditions S.
The property of being bubble-wrapped is therefore not the mask for the glass's
fragility - the mask is the enchantment, and intrinsic. When we look for a fink or a
mask in a particular case, we look for actually instantiated properties that would
stop the disposition from manifesting, were the object to undergo the stimulus
conditions. There is no actually instantiated property that is extrinsic to the
enchanted glass, considered before the enchantment is triggered, which would
prevent the glass from breaking, should it be struck. And just because the
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enchantment is disposed to cause events that are extrinsic to the glass does not, of
course, make it extrinsic. 19
The second worry is that our intuitions are confused by the fact that the mask is
magical - and maybe it is hard to think of enchantments as being intrinsic. So perhaps
it is a good idea to pause here and discuss a more realistic example of an intrinsic
mask. In the following sections, however, I will stay with the example of Magic
Wrap, as its similarity to cases of masking already in the literature will help to make
my point.
Miraculin The Miraculin protein binds to receptors on the tongue, so that
sour foods taste sweet and sweet food taste sour for some time after the
Miraculin is eaten. Suppose Miraculin is found in a sour fruit. That fruit will
in fact, when eaten, taste sweet. The sourness is masked by the Miraculin;
the fruit is still sour, despite the taste-illusion. 20
An intrinsic property of the fruit, having the Miraculin protein, prevents the person
eating the fruit from tasting the sourness. The Miraculin's interaction with the taste
buds hides the sourness, just as the bubble-wrap produced by the enchantment hides
the fragility of the glass in Magic Wrap.
19 A possible reply to this is that what the Superficial Dispositionalists are really worried about are
supposed finks and masks operating via a causal chain that is entirely intrinsic - the necessary
condition in question should be: if the glass's enchantment were to operate via an entirely
intrinsic causal chain, then the glass would not be fragile. I discuss this amendment to SD in
section 5 of this chapter.
20 Despite the name, Miraculin is not magical. There is a berry, Synsepalum dulcificum, or "miracle
fruit", which contains Miraculin. It is slightly different, however, to the kind of fruit in this
example: it does not make sweet foods taste sour, and it does not itself taste sweet, either
because it does not have the acidity that is made to taste sweet by the Miraculin, or because the
Miraculin takes some time to work.
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We can now argue in a similar way to before. Could one insist that the fruit in
Miraculin is not sour, since it contains the Miraculin protein? Consider some
ordinary sour fruit, coated in Miraculin. It has its sourness masked extrinsically -
should it be consumed, it would not taste sour, as the Miraculin coating prevents it
from tasting sour. The ordinary fruit is sour, even though it would not taste sour -
just like the ordinary glass wrapped in bubble-wrap is fragile. The explanation for
why the ordinary fruit doesn't taste sour is that the Miraculin's interaction with the
tastebuds prevents the coated fruit from tasting sour. But a similar explanation
holds for why the Miraculin containing fruit does not taste sour. Why would the
Miraculin's interaction with one's tastebuds prevent fruit from tasting sour when it
is coated with it, but not prevent anything when the Miraculin is intrinsic to the
fruit?
We are not tempted to say that the Miraculin has made other sour foods turn
sweet during the time that it has its effect on the tastebuds. It provides us with a
taste-illusion - things don't taste as they actually are. The same thing applies to the
fruit in Miraculin. Moreover, similar to what we saw with Magic Wrap, the
Miraculin's effect on the tastebuds seems to prevent both kinds of fruit from tasting
sour in the same way. If you claim that the fruit in Miraculin is not sour, but sweet,
you have good reason to also hold this for fruit merely coated in Miraculin.
The simplest explanation is that the Miraculin protein rewires the tastebuds so
that sour foods taste sweet and sweet foods taste sour. Alternatively, according to
SD, the fruit in Miraculin must be itself sweet. But then the explanation for how
Miraculin works is more complicated than it needs to be - the supporter of SD must
claim that Miraculin makes sweet foods taste sour except for when they contain
Miraculin.
In sum, there are examples of dispositional interference from sources intrinsic to
an object that do not remove the disposition itself, although they would prevent it
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from manifesting. If we resist this, and claim that these examples are not ones of
dispositional interference without loss of disposition, we cause problems for
arguments for extrinsic dispositional interference without loss of disposition. The
very same explanations for the existence of paradigmatic extrinsic finks and masks
apply to cases of intrinsic dispositional interference.
3.3 SD Conflicts with the Intrinsic Dispositions Thesis
My examples in the last two sections showed a tension between accepting the
explanation for why potential extrinsic interference does not remove a disposition,
but not accepting that there could be intrinsic masking. The same explanations for
why extrinsic finking and masking is possible applies to Magic Wrap and Miraculin.
We can also construct an example to show that SD conflicts with the intrinsic
dispositions thesis, as it applies to fragility, by introducing a variation on Magic
Wrap.
An Intrinsic Mask (Spray and Wrap): A sorcerer enchants a glass in exactly the
same way as in Magic Wrap, so that the enchantment will attempt to wrap the
glass in bubble-wrap created by the enchantment, should the glass be about to
be struck. This glass is therefore intrinsically identical to the one in Magic
Wrap. However, the glass is being watched over by some mischievous imp with
very quick reaction times. This imp has at hand some powerful non-stick
spray, which she will spray on the glass should it be struck. She would prevent
the magic bubble-wrap from staying in place to protect the glass - and
therefore the glass would break if struck. 21
21 Again, if you are worried about the use of magic here, consider a variation on Miraculin where
someone has a spray that would prevent the Miraculin from being able to affect the taste buds.
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If the Superficial Dispositionalist is correct in claiming that there can be no intrinsic
sources of dispositional interference, it follows that the glass in Magic Wrap cannot
be fragile. But by the (paradigmatic) intrinsic dispositions thesis, this means that the
glass in Spray and Wrap also cannot be fragile, though the intrinsic interferer was
unsuccessful in protecting it. If fragility is an intrinsic property, then all duplicates
should share it. Yet how can the glass in Spray and Wrap not be fragile? This glass
breaks via the same mechanism by which a normal, non-enchanted glass breaks.
The glass in Spray and Wrap is undeniably fragile; it appears that the breaking
occurred because the enchantment failed to save the glass from its own fragility. So
the Superficial Dispositionalist is forced to say that the glass in Magic Wrap is not
fragile, despite the fact that it is a duplicate of a fragile glass. Therefore, there is a
tension between accepting SD and holding on to the intrinsic dispositions thesis for
fragility. 22
This does not only apply to fragility, however - it extends also to other
paradigmatic dispositions. Now we have seen how an intrinsic property may
prevent a glass from breaking though it is still fragile, similar cases can be
constructed for other paradigmatic dispositions like conductivity, solubility, and
elasticity. And for any of these other dispositions, an intrinsic interferer may also
fail to successfully prevent the disposition from manifesting. This means that cases
can be constructed, in this manner, for any of the supposedly paradigmatic
dispositions, which show that ifwe hold on to SD, then these dispositions are not
intrinsic.
Could we take this to show that cases like Magic Wrap are not examples of
intrinsic masking? You may think that Magic Wrap does not involve an intrinsic
22 In section 4.1 I will consider a reply to this: that although these cases show that SD conflicts
with the (paradigmatic) intrinsic dispositions thesis, and so even paradigmatic dispositions like
fragility are extrinsic, there may still be a sense in which paradigmatic dispositions can be
intrinsic to objects.
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mask because what is really doing the work is the enchantment plus the lack of imp
and non-stick spray. Since there is a lack of spray (and lack of watchful imp) at the
time when we are inquiring as to whether the glass is fragile, the property of being
in the company of such an imp is not ineligible to be considered as (part of) a mask
for the glass's fragility at that time. If the mask is the enchantment plus the external
circumstances - the lack of imp and non-stick spray - then the mask is extrinsic.
We should note, however, that the lack of imp and spray in this case is only a
background condition for the mask's successful prevention of the disposition's
manifestation. It is not actively the source of the masking - not the mask itself.
Similarly, the striking of a match is the cause of the match lighting, although there
also needs to be sufficient oxygen present for successful lighting. Interference can
come from an intrinsic source even though something outside the object could block
that intrinsic interference. In these sorts of cases the interferer is intrinsic, but
whether the interferer is successful in preventing the manifestation of the disposition is
determined in part by how things are outside the object. This shows we should
distinguish between the intrinsicality/extrinsicality of the mask itself, and whether
the mask's being successful is an intrinsic or extrinsic matter. For any intrinsic
interferer to do its thing, it will need fortuitous extrinsic background conditions.
For example, the sweaty chameleon will require that there are no super-drying fans
in the vicinity if its red sweat is to successfully mask its greenness. If the
background conditions that allow for the successful blocking of a disposition must be
considered as part of the mask or fink, this will mean that SD is only trivially true.
It will only be true because holding it forces us to think of all interference as
extrinsic. There will be no cases of dispositional interference from an intrinsic
source that are also cases of finking or masking - but this will be only because there
are no cases of dispositional interference from an intrinsic source.
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Moreover, fortuitous background conditions must be in place in order for even a
paradigmatic disposition to manifest in its stimulus conditions. There must be no
protective sorcerers or imps armed with non-stick spray in the vicinity - or bubble-
wrap - in order for a fragile glass to break. Suppose we insist that the lack of imp
and spray in Magic Wrap must be part of the mask, so that the mask in my case is
extrinsic, and so not a counterexample to SD. Then we have reason to accept that
because the lack of sorcery and padding is required in order for an ordinary fragile
glass to break, fragility is extrinsic.
I do not here want to attempt to give a theory of when something is actively a
cause and when it is merely a facilitating background condition; such a theory is not
needed for this project. We do have some intuitive grasp on the distinction. And if
it turns out that there is no distinction in the vicinity (which I doubt), this would
simply show that all interference is extrinsic. This would not be a point in favor of
the Superficial Dispositionalist. For then there would be no intrinsic interference at
all - and for SD to be a substantial and interesting position there needs to be cases of
intrinsic interference that are not cases of intrinsic finking or masking.
Paradigmatic dispositions are not intrinsic if SD is true. Since the success of the
dispositional interference depends in part on fortuitous background conditions, a
potential intrinsic interferer may not successfully prevent a disposition from
manifesting. However, there will be duplicates of this object for which the
interferer is successful. Where the interferer is not successful, the object behaves as
it would if the interferer wasn't there, and the disposition manifests via the same
kind of causal chain as it would in an ordinary case. This means that, if we accept
SD, we have cases of duplicates which differ with respect to their (paradigmatic)
dispositions.
PAGE 33 OF 95
3.3 An Intrinsic Fink
In both Magic Wrap and Spray and Wrap, the intrinsic interferer worked by masking a
disposition. We can also construct a similar case for finking.
An Intrinsic Fink (Genie in a Glass): An intrinsically enchanted glass is such that
were it to be struck, its intrinsic enchantment would cause a genie to appear,
who would then stop the glass from breaking by changing the micro-structure
of the glass. The source of the finking is an intrinsic property of the glass, and
thus there is an intrinsic fink.
Now, if we were to claim that the glass with the genie isn't fragile, this is what we
will have to accept: the glass isn't fragile, but the genie still appears to stop
something from happening - the breaking of the glass. It seems extremely odd to
say that the glass isn't fragile, yet something had to stop it from breaking when it
was struck.
4.0 Contingently Intrinsic Dispositions and the Part/Whole Objection
In the previous sections, I argued that 1) we can apply arguments for the existence
of extrinsic finking and masking to particular cases of intrinsic dispositional
interference, and 2) if SD is true, then paradigmatic dispositions like fragility are
extrinsic. There are two further objections to my arguments that I will consider.
The first rejects the (paradigmatic) intrinsic dispositions thesis, but allows us to
continue using the method of considering the dispositions of duplicates to determine
an object's dispositions - although only for a limited range of cases. The second
gives an error theory for why my cases look like ones involving intrinsic finking and
masking, but in fact are not.
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4.1 Intrinsic Dispositions vs. Having Dispositions Intrinsically
The supporter of SD might think that Magic Wrap and Spray and Wrap show that
fragility can be either intrinsic or extrinsic to an object. The objection would run
something like this: these cases, although they show that fragility is sometimes had
extrinsically, do not show that fragility is always had extrinsically. Properties may
be contingently intrinsic to their particular bearers. Take, for example, the
property of being near a red thing. That property can be had both intrinsically or
extrinsically - something red may have the property of being near a red thing in
virtue of the way it is intrinsically, but a non-red thing can only have this property
extrinsically.23 Similarly, although one glass may have fragility intrinsically, others
may not. In Spray and Wrap, this line of thought would continue, the glass is fragile;
the glass is not fragile in Magic Wrap, where it is enchanted but will not be sprayed.
Whether this glass is fragile is thus extrinsic, as there are duplicates that differ with
respect to whether they have the property or not. This doesn't mean, however,
that fragility is had extrinsically in non-enchanted glasses.
This objection makes an important distinction. We can talk about the
intrinsic/extrinsic distinction with regards to properties as such, or we can talk
about properties being had by objects intrinsically or extrinsically. Where a
property can be had either intrinsically or extrinsically, the property itself will come
out as extrinsic on the standard way of drawing the distinction, as there will be
instances of the property that are not shared by intrinsic duplicates. Being near a red
thing is an extrinsic property because there are cases where an object has that
property, but its duplicates do not share it. However, though being near a red thing is
an extrinsic property, it can still be had intrinsically in some cases - by those things
that are themselves red.
23 See (Humberstone 1996: 227-8) for this distinction.
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Will it help the Superficial Dispositionalist to claim that the glass's fragility in
Magic Wrap is had extrinsically? The upshot of this reply is that Choi's tests will not
work reliably for all cases of even paradigmatic dispositions such as fragility. This is
a problem for Choi's tests, as ways of determining whether a given object has a
disposition, only if we do not have some way of distinguishing the cases of fragility
had intrinsically from those of fragility had extrinsically. However, it is a problem
for Choi's tests as providing grounds for SD if we cannot give a way to distinguish these
cases that does not appeal to whether there is potential intrinsic interference or not.
This means that even if the Superficial Dispositionalist gives up on the intrinsic
dispositions thesis, but clings on to the idea that sometimes paradigmatic dispositions
are had intrinsically by their bearers, they still do not have any argument for SD.
4.2 The Part/Whole Objection
In the cases discussed, you might think, the reason we are willing to attribute a
disposition to the object in question, even though the disposition is prevented from
manifesting by an intrinsic property, is that we are confusing a disposition of a part
for a disposition of the whole. In Magic Wrap, the objection would go, the part of
the glass that does not have the enchantment really is fragile (call this part "glass-
minus") - but this does not mean that the glass with the enchantment is fragile. We
should compare my cases with this one: a pile of uranium has the disposition to
explode, as it is above critical mass. However, inserted into the uranium are some
rods which help to absorb the rogue neutrons that would otherwise bring about a
chain reaction which would culminate in the uranium's explosion. The rods, being
extrinsic to the uranium, do not affect the uranium's disposition to explode, on the
supposition that this disposition is intrinsic to the uranium. However, the uranium-
plus-rods, as a complex object, does not have the disposition to explode. To think
that it does is to make the mistake of attributing a disposition had by part of the
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object, the part which is purely uranium, to the whole of the object, the uranium
plus rods. 24 Similarly, to think that the enchanted glass is fragile is to make the
mistake of attributing a disposition had by part of the object, glass-minus, to the
whole of the object, the whole enchanted glass.
This reply to my arguments assumes that properties are parts of objects, and that
by "removing" a property from an object we are left with another object,
ontologically robust enough to be the sort of thing which has dispositions - robust
enough to be an object itself. But properties just aren't parts of objects in the way
that objects can be parts of other objects. The glass can't be divided into two parts,
glass-minus and an enchantment, in the same way that the uranium-rods
combination can be divided into a part which is just the uranium, and a part which is
the rods. There simply is no such thing as glass-minus. The uranium and rods can
be separated, in a way that the enchantment may not be removable from the glass.
Moreover, there may be no physical part of the glass that is not enchanted - the
enchantment may be infused throughout - unlike in the uranium example, where
there are physical parts of the uranium-rods combination which do not have rods in
them. If the enchantment is an intrinsic property of every part of the glass, then
there is no part of the glass that can properly be thought of as the glass without the
enchantment.25
24 See Handfield and Bird (2008: 290-1) for this sort of objection, and this example.
25 The same thing holds for the fruit in Miraculin. Suppose that we have, in fact, made the
part/whole mistake here. Then we have confused a disposition of a part - the sourness of the
fruit sans Miraculin - for a disposition of the whole. But it need not be the case that there is a
part of the fruit that is protein-free in the way that the uranium is rod-free. Furthermore, the
protein might play a dual role in the fruit such that removing it would change the fruit so it was
no longer sour, or its sourness might be intrinsically masked by some new feature of the fruit.
So, 1) there need not be any physical part that doesn't contain Miraculin, and 2) if the Miraculin
is removed, the fruit need not be still sour, and 3) even if the fruit with Miraculin removed is
sour, it need not taste so (removing the Miraculin might make the fruit highly poisonous so that
it kills before one has time to taste it). The fact that the Miraculin could play this kind of dual
role shows that the mask may in fact be some property had in virtue of containing the Miraculin
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It may be that some examples of apparent intrinsic finks and masks are more
clearly vulnerable to this objection. For example, the objector might claim that the
berry that I mentioned at the beginning of this paper is non-poisonous as a whole,
although it has poisonous parts. When we think that this berry is poisonous, it may
seem we are confusing the poisonousness of the berry's flesh for the poisonousness
of the berry as a whole. Alternatively, you might think that poisonousness is
literally had by the whole berry, but poisonousness is instead the property of having
a part that is disposed to harm upon ingestion. Then, the Superficial Dispositionalist
could accept that the whole berry is poisonous even though some intrinsic property
of the berry masks the disposition to harm upon ingestion. The mask is extrinsic to
the flesh (the part that has the disposition to harm upon ingestion), so we do not
have an intrinsic mask. Perhaps, similarly, the chameleon is green because he has a
part that possesses the disposition to look green when viewed - greenness, on this
view, is the property of having a surface that is disposed to look green when viewed.
The mask, although intrinsic to the chameleon, is extrinsic to the skin - and thus the
mask is not intrinsic to the object that in fact has the disposition.
Yet the chameleon, presumably, would still be green in the dark even if the
properties in virtue of which he turned red were intrinsic to his skin. Even if his
skin were extremely photosensitive, and burned immediately when light hit it, he
would still be green. Similarly, a berry would be poisonous even if whatever
enzyme makes it poisonous were to be found in every cell of the berry, and it was
the cell walls themselves that were indigestible - and even if the enzyme could not
be extracted or exist in isolation from the berry.
Now, sometimes removing the masking property - in the original berry case,
the property of having an indigestible skin - is most easily done by removing a part
protein, thus not a part strictly speaking, of the fruit.
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of the object, leaving another part that would then manifest the disposition if it were
in the appropriate circumstances. But it does not automatically follow that the
disposition is only had by the part in question. In any case, for the Part/Whole
Objection to save SD, it has to be a plausible error theory for all cases of apparent
intrinsic finks or masks.
5.0 An Amendment to SD?
Although Magic Wrap, Spray and Wrap and Miraculin cases all involved an intrinsic
property preventing a disposition's proper manifestation, the successful prevention
was achieved via a causal chain that included extrinsic properties of the disposition-
bearer. This way of proceeding suggests that there may be a defensible position in
the vicinity of Superficial Dispositionalism - that dispositions cannot be finked or
masked by processes that run entirely intrinsic to the supposed disposition-bearer.
Given this observation, the Superficial Dispositionalist may wish to revise his
position and claim that instead of the relation of the source of the interference being
the important factor in determining whether the object has the disposition, what we
should focus on is how that interference would occur. If the glass's enchantment
does not utilize extrinsic means in order to stop the glass from breaking, perhaps
then our intuitions would rule in favor of the glass not being fragile. A principle
that captures this idea is the following:
Superficial Dispositionalism, Amended (SD*): If there is some intrinsic
property of an object x at time t which would prevent x from giving response M
to stimulus S and would do so via a causal chain that involves only properties
intrinsic to x and S, then, at time t, x does not have a disposition D(S,M) to give
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response M under S.26
Under this new version of Superficial Dispositionalism we can ask whether my
original arguments against ruling out intrinsic finking and masking have any bite.
When we thought of intrinsic finking and masking as defined by the relation of the
source of the interference to the disposition bearer, we saw that denying the
possibility of this kind ofintrinsic finking and masking undermined the reasons we
might have for thinking that there is finking and masking at all - even extrinsic
finking or masking. That made any argument for SD collapse into an argument
against finking or masking as such. However, the argument did rely on the
similarity of the method of protection in Magic Wrap and in cases of normal bubble-
wrapped glasses - a similarity that is had in part because the bubble-wrap in both
cases is extrinsic.
Return to the case of Magic Wrap. Here the intrinsic enchantment caused
bubble-wrap to appear around the glass, so that an intrinsic mask prevented the
breaking of the glass via extrinsic means. The enchantment need not do this,
however, to be a mask. This case was not set up in this manner because intrinsic
interferers can only be intrinsic masks when they prevent the manifestation of a
disposition via extrinsic means. This case was presented in this manner to show that
if you accepted the possibility of extrinsic finking and masking, you should also
accept counterexamples to SD.
If you accept Magic Wrap as a counterexample to SD, you should acknowledge
the existence of counterexamples to SD*. The regions of space that glasses occupy
26 Note that there is no requirement for the intrinsic property to hang around throughout the time
x undergoes the stimulus S. If there were, there would be a danger of the principle claiming
that a vase is not fragile because it has an intrinsic property - its shape - that is such that if it
hung around throughout the time the vase was undergoing physical stress, then the vase would
not break. In order for the intrinsic property to be fink or mask-like, however, it probably has
to stick around until at least the start of the stimulus event.
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aren't filled wall-to-wall with molecules. These spaces between the molecules of
glass are, however, part of the glass - glasses aren't scattered objects like my book
collection, some of which are found in my office, and others of which are found in
my home. So if, instead, the enchantment from Magic Wrap was to produce
cushioning bubbles that filled these spaces, instead of around the outside of the glass,
then the glass would not break, in virtue of a preventative causal chain that ran
entirely intrinsic to the glass. It is hard to see, however, why the mere intrinsicality
of the wrap in this way would render the glass non-fragile. The position of the
protective bubbles relative to the space the glass takes up does not seem to make a
dispositional difference.27
6.0 Conclusion
There is no principled way to exclude cases of intrinsic finking and masking without
giving up on finks and masks altogether. I have argued that if there are reasons to
think that there could not be intrinsic finking and masking, then there are reasons to
think that extrinsic finking and masking is not possible. Arguments for the possibility
of extrinsic finking and masking that turn on the disposition's figuring in explanations
extend to cases of intrinsic dispositional interference. Since the possibility of
extrinsic finking and masking is central to our understanding of dispositions, this
gives us reason to accept that there can be intrinsic finks and masks.
There is a further reason to accept the possibility of intrinsic finks and masks - as
the argument against this is self-undermining. There are cases of apparent intrinsic
masks that we cannot reject without denying that paradigmatic dispositions are
intrinsic. Accepting that a paradigmatic disposition such as fragility is extrinsic
undermines Choi's argument for SD. The rejection of the paradigmatic intrinsic
27 Note also that Blushing Chameleon is a counterexample, as long as one accepts that colors are
dispositional.
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dispositions thesis also causes problems for arguments for the possibility of extrinsic
finking and masking, as these arguments often appeal to the clear possession of a
disposition in one case to show that a duplicate object in a finking or masking
scenario also has that disposition, despite the presence of the fink or mask.
The dispositional picture I prefer is one that does not treat dispositions as
superficial properties of objects. Dispositions may be masked or finked by other
intrinsic properties; dispositions can conflict within the very same object. One of
the advantages of this sort of view is that it opens the way for a dispositional theory
of mind that treats people as complex dispositional systems, with dispositions that
conflict, enable, and otherwise interact in order to produce the behavioural
responses we see. This chapter is just a start on this project; in the next chapter I
explore how a better understanding of dispositions, and how they can interfere with
one another, can help with giving a plausible metaphysics of the mind - in
particular, of desire.
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Chapter 2: Conflicts of Desire - What desire can teach us about the
metaphysics of the mind
Very few of us have a psychology such that all of our desires can be satisfied
together. Our everyday experience of desiring is that of competing wants pushing
and pulling us in different directions. Such is the stuff of human drama and tension,
of movies, novel plot-lines, and song lyrics - someone who loves two people, but
cannot be with both, or wants to be with someone but is also drawn to another
lifestyle that they believe to be incompatible with the requiting of the love. Or
someone who wants very much to pursue their dreams but also wants to live up to a
parent's very different dreams for them. However, it is not just pop culture that
recognizes conflicts of desire - even the Bible talks about conflicts of desire, about
desiresfighting against each other: "What causes fights and quarrels among you?
Don't they come from your desires that battle within you?" (James 4:1). Our
ordinary conception of desiring involves thinking of desires as forces which battle
against each other, that cause us to feel "torn", and that may overpower each other.
But desire conflict is also experienced at a less dramatic level - I may want to
have more of the main course, but I also want to leave room for dessert. I want to
soak up some beach-front sunshine on my next holiday, but I also want to go skiing.
I want to finish the novel I'm reading tonight, but I also want to get my work done.
These desires are experienced as conflicting - if I have more of the main course, then
I can't have dessert, if I go on holiday in the Caribbean I can't also go to Colorado,
and if I finish my novel then, unfortunately, I'm not going to finish my work.
Such desire conflicts, I will argue, pose a problem for the standard accounts of
the relationship between mental states and behavioral dispositions. These accounts,
I will argue, treat the relationship between our desires and our behavioral
dispositions in too holistic a fashion. On these accounts, while there might be
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conflicts between what we desire - conflicts in the sense that not all of our desires
can be satisfied together - it is thought that this conflict does not translate into
dispositional conflict. On the level of dispositions, all is coherent and conflict-free -
our dispositions are not determined piecewise by individual desires, but holistically
by our entire mental state system. But, I will argue, if we recognize that the
conflict that we experience when we have conflicting desires is mirrored in the
conflicting ways that we are disposed to behave, we get a more plausible picture of
the metaphysics of desire.
Firstly, this holism about mental causation - for short, holism - obscures
differences between how beliefs and desires interact, and how desires interact with
other desires. If we recognize, however, that desires that motivate towards action
essentially do so, even when you have stronger conflicting desires, we can account
for this difference. Secondly, if we accept that there is conflict between our
behavioral dispositions, we get a better account of the phenomenology of desire
conflict, and of cases of weakness or temptation.
I think that the move to holism stems from two mistakes. Firstly, philosophers of
mind tend to unapologetically focus on belief, and then assume that what they have
concluded about beliefs will unproblematically extend to the case of desire, with
merely minor modifications. The second mistake is to assume that dispositions
cannot themselves conflict - that if you are disposed to act in one way, you cannot
be disposed to act in conflicting ways, as a matter of metaphysics. If this is the case,
then desire conflicts could not also play out in corresponding dispositional conflicts.
In chapter 1 I argued that dispositions can conflict in the required manner, and I will
here explain how those conclusions can help us in constructing a dispositional theory
of mind.
I will focus on the motivational side of desire. The folk psychological concept of
desire is also bound up with affective states like happiness and pleasure. There is
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much more work to be done in this area, concerning how the motivational and
affective sides of desire hook up, and whether both are essential to the concept of
desire. 28 So it is also controversial whether everything that we call a "desire"
essentially involves some motivation towards bringing about some state of affairs. I
do not intend to settle these questions here. My main point is that those desires that
do potentially motivate towards action, can and do simultaneously dispose you to
act in conflicting ways. So when I talk of desire here, I will be talking about desire
as a motivational state.
In section 1 I will give an overview of functionalist accounts of the mind and how
we got to a holism about mental causation. In section 2, I will argue that these
holistic accounts face problems when we move our focus from belief to desire, as
beliefs interact with each other very differently than do desires. In section 3, I will
argue that there is an important difference between how our desires depend on our
beliefs in issuing in behavior, and how our desires depend on other desires. Finally,
in section 4, drawing from my work on the metaphysics of dispositional properties
in chapter 1, I will conclude by proposing a way in which we might reconceptualize
the relationship between mental states and behavioral dispositions to fit with our
everyday experience of conflicting desires.
1.0 The Tale of the Rejection of Behaviorism
Once upon a time, there was behaviorism. The behaviorists claimed that mental
states are just behavioral dispositions. My belief that my team won the championship
just is the disposition to act in certain ways: to jump up and down, cheer excitedly,
go around with a smile on my face, and so on. My desire to drink some coffee, the
28 See (Humberstone 1990) for a good discussion of this. For empirical work on the difference
between wanting (motivation) and liking (affective) components, see (Berridge 2004), and
(Robinson and Berridge 1998).
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behaviorists said, just is the disposition to do things that will get me coffee, and to
pour the liquid down my throat when I get it. Mental states are not "hidden' or
inner' states that then determine our behavioral dispositions; they simply are these
dispositions.
Behaviorism, the story continues, hit some problems. One of the major strikes
against it was the claim that mental states do not dispose us to act in solitudo. The
behavioral dispositions that we have in virtue of believing or desiring something are
dependent on what other mental states we are in. We aren't disposed towards any
particular behavior, in virtue of some single belief - for example, there is no
particular disposition associated with the belief that this bus goes to Central Square; in
order to get this belief involved in producing behavior, we need some desire: Do I
want to go to Central Square? 29
So, since it seems that there is no particular behavior necessarily associated with
the belief that this bus goes to Central Square, it cannot be that this belief is identical to
some particular behavioral disposition. Thus the project of analyzing individual
mental states in purely behavioristic terms fails - in order to define what it is to
believe something, in terms of particular behavioral dispositions, we will also need
to appeal to what else you believe and desire.
Desires, too, seems to depend on beliefs in order to dispose you to do particular
things. Although desires seem to involve a push towards action, they don't
generally push towards particular actions without a representation of the world -
without beliefs. In order to get started on a plan concerning how to bring about
things that I want, I need to have some beliefs about how the world actually is - I
29 I don't here wish to intend to enter into the controversy about whether Humean belief-desire
psychology is true. There may be beliefs that motivate without the assistance of a relevant
desire - but all that is needed for this point is that some beliefs require an accompanying desire
to dispose us towards particular actions. If that is the case, then these beliefs - and thus beliefs
in general - cannot be identical to particular behavioral dispositions.
PAGE 46 OF 95
_ __iii;_i__i______i_ _ _
need to have some representation of my actual situation. I also need to have some
beliefs about how to getfrom the suitation represented as being actual to a situation
in which my desire is satisfied. If I desire that I have a cup of coffee, in order to act
from this desire I need to have some beliefs about how I might get one.
So, for the purposes of issuing in behavioral dispositions, desires generally
depend on beliefs, and a belief generally depends on which desires the believer has.
But philosophers of mind have gone further than this in their story, and claim that
our beliefs and desires determine how we are disposed to behave as a "corporate
body", as an entire system, in concert. Thus the way any one mental state disposes
us, they think, in fact depends on the entirety of our mental state system. For
example, David Braddon-Mitchell and Frank Jackson claim that the belief that there
is a tiger in the vicinity does not dispose you on its own towards any particular
behavior, because "[i]t is a whole complex of mental states that points to running in
a certain direction, not any one or another individual mental states...the behavior
which subjects are disposed to manifest depends on the totality of the mental states
they are in" (1996: 37). This means that it is not just that beliefs depend on desires
for issuing in behavioral dispositions and that desires depend on beliefs - in addition,
beliefs will depend on the existence of other beliefs, and desires will depend on the
existence of other desires.
To motivate this view, let's look at a particular case. Say that I believe that it's
raining. What particular behavior this belief helps lead me to embark upon depends
on what other mental states I am in. But my behavior does not just depend on my
desires, such as the desire to stay dry. My beliefs concerning how I can stay dry will
also affect how I behave. Do I believe that taking an umbrella will keep me dry? If I
do, then I will bring an umbrella if I go outside. Well, then it seems plausible that I
am disposed to take an umbrella should I go outside. But if I also believe that I don't
have an umbrella, or don't remember where I put it, then I won't take an umbrella
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if I go outside. So, if I also have this additional mental state, it seems that I'm not
disposed to take an umbrella if I go out (though I would be if I knew where to find
it). And so on. We can keep adding beliefs to this (non-maximal) set of beliefs and
desires, and change the facts about what I would do in virtue of the belief that it's
raining. How some particular belief helps guide you to action can depend on other
features of your representation of the world. Therefore, on this view, how you are
disposed to act in virtue of a particular belief changes with the changing of your
other mental states. Here, whether the belief that umbrellas are good for keeping
one dry results in my being disposed to take an umbrella is dependent on whether I
have beliefs about the location of umbrellas.
I will of course have beliefs that don't make a difference with respect to how I
act in virtue of believing that it's raining. My beliefs about Ancient Rome don't
make a difference as to whether I go outside or not, or whether I take an umbrella
or not. So when it is claimed that how I disposed to act in virtue of being in a
particular mental state depends on my entire mental state system, a particular sort of
dependence is meant:
Dependence: If a subject S has a mental state M, and M would change S's
behavior in some circumstance C, then M does change S's behavioral dispositions
concerning C.
So even though my beliefs about Ancient Rome don't have any effect one way or the
other on how I would behave in situations where I believe it's raining (and don't
have any other super-weird beliefs about the relevance of Rome to rain),
Dependence is still true for them.
Now, I think that of course how we will act in virtue of having a particular
mental state will depend on our entire mental state system, but this is not the same
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as thinking that how we are disposed to act depends on our entire set of mental
states. It is plausible that which particular behavioral dispositions we have in virtue
of having some belief, such as the belief that it is raining, depends in this way on
what other beliefs we have. As I mentioned previously, because beliefs are
representations of the world, and do not themselves, in the absence of desire,
involve inclinations towards changing the world, they must work together with
desire to dispose us towards particular actions.30 But they also depend on other
beliefs, because the dispositions we have in virtue of our desires depend on these
other beliefs. Generally speaking, a belief does not recommend action of even a
general nature without some desire, and that desire depends, in the way discussed
above, on the totality of our beliefs, to incline us towards some particular action.
On the other hand, although desires, in the absence of belief, do not in general
incline us towards particular actions,3" they do, as motivational states, involve
inclination towards action - towards doing things, in general, which we believe will
bring about their content. They don't seem to depend on the rest of our desires to
issue in a particular recommendation towards action. In the following section, I will
further explain this intuitive difference between belief and desire.
2.0 Differences Between Belief and Desire
We should not extend to the case of desiring the idea that beliefs depend (in the way
outlined in the last section) on all our other beliefs in how they issue in behavioral
30 The claim here should really be tempered: although I think this is how beliefs are often
conceived of, I am open to the possibility that beliefs alone incline us towards assertions of their
contents, and also perhaps incline us to particular reactions (reactions of surprise, perhaps,
when we confronted with things seeming to be the opposite of how we believe them to be).
31 It may be that some desires do not require representations of how things are in order to issue in
action - the desire to move my body in a certain way which has been habitualized might, for
example, not require a belief about how to do so, but may by itself directly issue in a behavioral
disposition.
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dispositions - in other words, we should not think that our behavioral dispositions
that we have in virtue of a particular desire depend on all our other desires. Desires
have a certain independence from other desires, I will argue, in their determination of
our dispositions to act.
There are many reasons to expect a difference in our metaphysics of belief and of
desire, particularly in the way that they interact with states of the same kind. One
of the ways in which beliefs differ from desires in this respect is that we are under
rational requirements to put our beliefs together into a coherent picture of the
world. We ought, rationally speaking, to have consistent beliefs. Not so for
desires. There are no rational requirements to have consistent desires; there is
nothing rationally wrong with having a desire set that is not closed under
conjunction. It seems intuitive that it ought (where this is an 'ought' of rationality)
to be the case that if I believe that p and I believe that q, then I believe that p&q. 32
But it is not rationally required that if I desire that p and desire that q, then I desire
that p&q. p&q together might be terrible!33 Or impossible ." The (practically)
32 Although if we assume that the doxastic attitude comes in degrees and has a threshold at which
the degree is high enough for the state to count as being a belief, this may not always be the
case. If the degree of either the belief that p or the belief that q is very close to the threshold,
and the other is sufficiently less than 1, then the conjunction of the two might be below the
threshold. However, this is the case for most belief combinations, and will always be the case if
we only have all-or-nothing belief.
33 Terrible: I may want to do a lot of things different things today, maybe I want to visit my aunt in
Westville, and I also want to visit my grandparents in Eastville, and I also want to visit my
parents in Southville, and so on. For each of these things, it is such that I want to do them today
- but it is not the case that I want to do the conjunction of these today - I would not get much
time with each relative, and I'd spend so much time traveling that I'd be exhausted! It's not
even that I want this conjunctive situation less than each of the individual desire contents - I
assign a negative weight to it.
Alternatively, you might claim that I'm not being very accurate about the contents of my
desires - what I want is to spend the entire day with my aunt, and spend the entire day with my
grandparents, and so on. But then we get a case of a desire that is impossible to satisfy, in the
practical sense, if we try to conjoin these desires to make one big conjunctive desire - quite
apart from the fact that this doesn't seem an accurate description of what we desire.
34 Practically Impossible: I want to be healthier, so I want to not eat this piece of cake. But the cake
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impossible case generates the experience of desire conflict of the type I mentioned
at the beginning of this essay. The case of the terrible conjunction generates another
form of desire conflict - I want both things, but I don't want both together. In each
case of conflict I am forced (though in two different senses - in the impossibility
case, by practical considerations; in terribleness case, by evaluative considerations)
to choose between two things that I want separately. But the impossibility of p&q
(or the unattractiveness of p&q) does not give me any rational reasons to give up
either the desire that p or the desire that q. On the other hand, if p&q is impossible,
I ought either to give up the belief that p, or the belief that q.
Beliefs, in most psychologies, generally form a much more coherent system than
one's set of desires. Most of us, I would think, have a larger proportion of
conflicting desires than we do conflicting beliefs. And generally, when we have
conflicting beliefs, this is only because we are unaware of the fact - most of the time
once we become aware of the fact that we have conflicting beliefs, we try to resolve
this conflict, if possible. Not so for desires.
For desires, the resolution generally comes in deciding what to do, not in
removing one of the conflicting desires. In the resolution of conflicting beliefs we
will generally lose one or other of the beliefs. This means that, once resolved, belief
conflict just does not exist. Thus , at least after resolution, we will not have
conflicting dispositions in virtue of our different beliefs, holding the set of desires
constant - if there is any conflict, it must stem from our conflicting desires, not
beliefs. In the resolution of desire conflicts, however, we often retain the desire that
looks so delicious .... I want to have it! It seems right to describe me as having two desires that
conflict with each other - I desire to eat the cake and I desire to refrain from eating the cake -
but it doesn't seem right to say that I desire that I-eat -the-cake-and-not-eat-the-cake. This is
not to rule out that we could have desires with impossible objects - I'm not sure what I want to
say about that - but just that, if there are such cases, this doesn't look like one of them.
35 This is a wide-scope requirement - I ought to give up one or the other, even though there need
be no rational requirement to give up one in particular.
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is defeated. The resolution of desire conflicts generally (although not necessarily 6)
involves forming an intention to satisfy some desire, without the purging of the
other desires that conflict with it. So even once we have decided what course of
action we are going to take - and thus which desire (or desires) we are going to
satisfy - we can still feel the pull of a foregone option, because we still want to take
that option, even though we don't want it most.
This pull requires effort to resist. When I still feel the attractiveness of what I in
fact want less, I will need to exercise self-control. I may want most of all to finish
the work that I'm doing, but be tempted by the lure of surfing the internet instead.
I want to check my email, read the news, peruse facebook - but it is not what I want
most. Should I in fact resist the temptation, this will require effort on my part.
There is a feeling of having to hold oneself back, to counteract something that draws
you towards the tempting option - in this case, the temptation of procrastination.
It is not just that itfeels like self-control requires effort. Empirical research has
shown that self-control relies on glucose; self-control reduces blood glucose levels,
and ability to control oneself diminishes with reduction in blood glucose levels, but
can be strengthened by taking glucose. 37 Such results suggest that desires are active
forces which have to be counterbalanced even when they are not one's strongest
desires - requiring energy to do so. 38
36 It may sometimes involve the loss of one of the desires instead. For example, you might reflect
on the object of that desire and comes to see that it is not really something you want at all, and
so lose all inclination towards it. This will mostly involve cases where you learn that a desirable
feature that you thought an object had was mistakenly attributed by you to the object - as when
I learn that my favorite Thai restaurant has stopped making both yellow curry and drunken
noodles, and I thereby lose the desire to go there - perhaps thus resolving the conflict between
wanting to eat at that restaurant and wanting to save some money.
37 See (Gailliot et al. 2007).
38 There may be beliefs that also require effort to resist acting on, but these beliefs are generally
pathological and desire-driven, such a compulsive thoughts. The point required here is not that
all beliefs fail to have these features, but simply that the kinds of beliefs that have been focused
on in constructing functionalist theories of the mind are not of this kind.
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So we ought to think that, at least in coherent psychologies, beliefs work
together in they way they incline us towards action - they form a cooperative unit
in which there are no opposing contributions to our behavioral dispositions. 39 They
are generally coherent, consistent. Our belief set can handle some amount of
fragmentation, but introduce too much inconsistency, and we no longer have
something that can be described as belief. Desires are very different to this; our
desire set admits of much more fragmentation - our wants and needs compete with
each other for satisfaction. We aren't under any rational requirements to have
consistent desires. Fragmentation is unfortunate, because it means that our desires
are not be able to be satisfied together (unless our beliefs about the way the world is
are false in the right ways), but this is not something we are rationally required to
fix, and it is something we find quite often.
Focusing on beliefs has made philosophers of mind think that our mental states
together, as a corporate body, to determine our behavioral dispositions - because
beliefs do form a single system. Yet it is more plausible to think that only our beliefs
work together as a unit, disposing us to act in conjunction with independent,
autonomous desires.
In sum, beliefs do form a coherent system (or we are at least are under rational
requirements to make them so) whereas desires do not; thus we should expect that,
in normal cases, our beliefs work together to dispose us towards action through our
desires. Our desires, even when we are completely rational, may form a
fragmented set. So we should not expect that our desires work together in the same
way. So the relations between desires are quite different to the relations between
beliefs. In the following section, I will explain how the behavioral dispositions that
we have in virtue of some desire have certain properties changed by properties of
39 Psychologies with contradictory beliefs may be a different matter, but I will not go into that
here.
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accompanying beliefs, but that the presence of other desires do not change these
properties. This gives us further reason to expect that even though desires depend
on the totality of our belief system for how they dispose us towards action, desires
do not depend on the totality of our desire set for this.
3.0 Desire/Belief vs. Desire/Desire Dependence
An interesting difference between belief/desire dependencies (the way our beliefs
depend on our desires to issue in behavior) and desire/desire dependencies (how
desires depend on other desires to issue in behavior) is that beliefs may affect
properties of the behavioral disposition itself - in particular, its strength - whereas
the existence of other desires simply changes whether a desire will issue in action.
Thus the way in which the behavioral dispositions which we have in virtue of some
desire depends on the existence of certain beliefs is quite different to the
relationship between the distinct desires in determining those dispositions.
It is often assumed that we act on our strongest desires. 40 However, this is not
the case. What I want most of all might be to win the lottery. Yet because I'm
pretty realistic about my chances of actually winning, I am not very strongly inclined
towards buying lottery tickets. Thus the strength of the behavioral disposition I
have in virtue of desiring the win the lottery is determined in part by my beliefs
about the likelihood of my actions resulting in a win. 4' The disposition I have
towards buying a lottery ticket is pretty weak, given the beliefs I have concerning
the chances of a pay-off - and this is despite how much I want to win the lottery. In
general, the strength of the behavioral disposition that I have in virtue of desiring
that p is determined by the strength of that desire together with the likelihood of
success that I ascribe to the actions which I might perform to try to bring about p.
40 See (Davidson 1980: 23) for example.
41 See, for example, (Mele 2003).
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However, desires don't affect the behavioral dispositions generated by other
desires in the same way.42 Desires together with beliefs generate dispositions of
certain strengths; however, the behavioral dispositions that we have in virtue of
some desire depends on the existence of other desires not for strength, but for
whether that having disposition results in action.
The holist, of course, will claim that desires depend on other desires in the
generation of behavioral dispositions for whether there is a behavioral disposition at
all. Now, desires can depend on beliefs for whether there is a behavioral disposition
at all - if you have no beliefs about how to bring about the content of some desire,
then there will be no disposition towards any particular behavior. 4 3 But this is
because there is no behavior recommended in virtue of having that desire. On the
other hand, when you do have some idea about how to satisfy a desire, but would
not do so because you want other incompatible things more, there is some action
recommended by that desire together with means/end beliefs.
All we need is that desires depend on the existence of other desires for whether
we act from them. We do not also need to claim that desires depend on other
desires for which behavioral dispositions they issue in. If we can have conflicts of
dispositions - if you can be disposed both towards phi-ng and not phi-ing - we can
better account for several features of desires: their phenomenology and how they
interact.
42 The desire that p may affect the strength of the behavioral disposition which one has in virtue of
the desire that q, but the relation is not direct as it is in the case of desire/belief interaction.
See the discussion of temptation in the following section.
43 I think that there may be a disposition, however, of a general kind. Suppose I have a desire to
have an enjoyable evening. If I have no beliefs about how to do so, I will have no dispositions
towards particular actions. However, I will have the disposition to do things this evening such
that I believe they would be enjoyable - a second order disposition towards having particular
first order dispositions, should I come to have the relevant beliefs.
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4.0 Dispositional Holism
One of the reasons I think that we have ended up with holism about mental
causation is because it is commonly assumed that behavioral dispositions cannot
conflict. This means that you cannot be disposed towards phi-ing and
simultaneously disposed towards actions incompatible with phi-ing.
Now, cases of dispositional interference - cases where dispositions fail to
manifest in the appropriate conditions due to some interfering factor - are widely
accepted. 44 These cases show that dispositions cannot be reduced to counterfactuals
- an object may have a disposition though the associated counterfactual is false. A
glass might be fragile, though should it be struck it would fail to break, due to being
wrapped in bubble-wrap - or perhaps due to some watchful sorcerer, ready to
change the glass to unbreakable material should it ever be struck, quickly enough to
prevent it from breaking. However, it is assumed that such cases can only involve
interference from properties external to the object. If there is potential
interference from within the object itself, it is thought that the object simply fails to
have the disposition in question. ¢ Glasses can be fragile yet saved from breaking by
guardian angels or bubble-wrap, but should the protection come from the glass
itself, the glass is ruled not fragile.
This sort of view leads to a kind of dispositional holism. On this kind of view, the
entire intrinsic state of the object determines whether the object has a particular
disposition. If you think that adding an intrinsic property, which would potentially
interfere with the manifestation of a disposition, in fact removes that disposition,
then you will think that the existence of the disposition depends on the absence of
44 See chapter 1, section 1.0 for more details.
45 For some recent statements of this view, see (Bird 2008), (Handfield and Bird 2008), (Cohen
and Handfield 2007), (Handfield 2008), and (Choi 2005).
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such properties. Thus, "[a]ll dispositions include the overall intrinsic state of an
object in what fixes whether the object has the disposition" (Handfield 2008).
In the first chapter, I argued against the claim that dispositional interference can
only be extrinsic. Objects (and people) can have a disposition, even though that
disposition is prevented from manifesting in the appropriate conditions by other
intrinsic dispositions of that object (or person). A berry may be poisonous, yet be
prevented from harming someone who ingests it by its thick skin. The digestibility
(or lack thereof) of the berry's skin prevents the poisonousness from having its
characteristic effect. Like the bubble-wrap which prevents the glass's fragility from
manifesting, the indigestibility of the skin prevents the berry's poisonousness from
manifesting.
The type of interference in the berry and bubble-wrap cases is often called
masking. This is distinguished in the dispositions literature fromfinking.46 Finks are
properties that prevent a disposition from manifesting by removing the disposition
before it has a chance to manifest. Finks, like masks, falsify the counterfactual
associated with the disposition. However, they do so by changing the dispositional
facts should the object ever undergo the very stimulus conditions for the
disposition. A sorcerer who is standing by, ready to change the fragile glass to an
unbreakable material should the glass be struck provides afink for the glass's
fragility. The glass would not break if struck, and this is because, should it ever be
struck, it would lose its fragility in time to prevent breaking.
Masking, on the other hand, prevents a disposition from manifesting without
removing the disposition in question. Bubble-wrap prevents the glass's fragility
from manifesting, but without removing the glass's fragility. Similarly, the
indigestibility of the berry's skin intervenes, but not by making the berry non-
46 See chapter 1, section 1.0, for definitions of finks and masks.
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poisonous - it does so by simply preventing the poisonousness from having its
characteristic effect.
Returning to the mind, we can see that such possibilities - possibilities of having
dispositions yet failing to manifest them (and this being not due to some outside
interference) - helps us with giving a plausible metaphysics of desire. Desires can
move us in opposing directions, yet of a pair of conflicting desires only one can
result in action. The presence of a particular disposition towards action prevents
another from manifesting. My desire for a good night's sleep results in a behavioral
disposition that prevents the disposition which I have in virtue of my desire for
coffee from resulting in action.
Conflicting desires require that there are intrinsic masks. But we also require
intrinsic finks, to account for cases of temptation. Temptation involves my being
disposed to act in one way, but in the very situation where that disposition should
manifest, my dispositions change.47 Joe wants most of all to eat healthily, but with
the chocolate cake in sight, the relative strength of his desires shift. His desire to eat
healthily should result in his declining the cake, but the sight of the cake strengthens
his desire for it, and weakens his desire to resist.
We also need intrinsic finking to account for cases of weakness that aren't quite
right to describe as temptation: Suzy might want most of all to do well on her test,
and so be disposed towards looking over Lucy's shoulder to get the answers. But at
the last minute, she might be overcome with guilt, and thus no longer desire to look
over Lucy's shoulder, and no longer be disposed to do so.
47 Usually finks are defined as properties that completely remove the disposition in question.
Successful temptation will usually not involve the total removable of the previously stronger
disposition, but a change in the relative strength of two dispositions such that the weaker now
becomes stronger. There will also be cases of unsuccessful temptation, where temptation does
not result in you acting against your better judgment, but where the presence of the tempting
option results in a weakening of the disposition to not take it.
48 Though it isn't clear that this is a case of a desire finking another desire (guilt may not be best
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As described in chapter 1, here is an example of an intrinsic fink: A pair of
spectacles may be transparent, although they would change to being dark upon
exposure to light. Although the spectacles have the dispositional property of being
transparent, they lose this upon entering into the very conditions that are the
stimulus conditions for transparency. They are prevented from manifesting their
transparency by their disposition to change to being opaque in the light.
5.0 Conclusion
My picture has the advantage of being able to account for an intuitive difference
between the way our desires depend on our beliefs for how we act in virtue of having
those desires, and the way in which our acting to satisfy a desire is dependent on the
existence of other desires. On the holist's picture, any behavioral disposition will be
removed both by the addition of a belief which makes the means of action seem less
attractive or else not possible (like the addition of the belief that there are no umbrellas
around here has on the disposition to take an umbrella which might be thought to be
had in virtue of the belief that it's raining), and also removed by a conflicting desire
(as the addition of a desire to have dessert might have on the disposition to have
seconds of the main course). This makes the existence of a disposition towards
action depend on both my other beliefs and desires, in much the same way.
However, the experience of conflicting desires involves an experience of being
pushed and pulled in different directions. Such a feeling is best understood in terms
of actually being pushed and pulled in different directions - being disposed towards
conflicting actions. The existence of active forces towards a lesser desired option is
shown by the effort it takes to resist desires. The holist, however, cannot think that
we are ever literally torn being two options, and they have no explanation for why
understood in terms of desires), it is still a case of a desire being finked.
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we feel we must hold ourselves back from things we want less - and why self-
control is hard.
The dispositional dependencies that holists about mental causation have seen
between beliefs and desires, and beliefs and other beliefs, do not also hold between
desires and other desires. We have good reason to accept that there are
dispositional dependencies between beliefs and desires, because properties of a
belief concerning the likelihood of success should we try to satisfy the desire affects
the resultant disposition's strength. But desires do not affect the strength of other
desires in this way. We also have good reason to think that beliefs generally depend
on our other beliefs for the way we will be disposed towards action in virtue of
them, since beliefs generally form a coherent system - whereas our desires are not
required to be consistent, and do seem to be individuated more clearly.
The picture we are left with is still compatible with many views of the
metaphysics of the mind - with both functionalism and dualism, for example. It
involves, however, thinking of our behavioral dispositions as conflicting rather than
coherent, and thus better accounts for the messiness and incoherence of our desires.
PAGE 60 OF 95
_; _________~ ~  *Illlli-i --tl ii-.i
Chapter 3: Deep, Dark,...or Transparent? Knowing Our Desires
Despite the fact that the term "introspection" is used to name the distinctive method
by which we know our own mental states, it is widely held that we do not look
inwards to find our beliefs. Instead, it is thought that we look outwards towards the
world - towards the belief's content. In this chapter I will look at recent attempts
to extend this epistemology of belief to our first-personal knowledge of our desires.
In the first section, I will sketch this type of account - a type of account that is
commonly called transparent - of introspection for belief. Following that, I will look
at attempts to extend this idea to our introspective knowledge of desire. I will
discuss two attempts to apply the idea of transparency to introspection of our
desires, and I argue that neither suceeds. In section 4, I outline a further type of
transparent account. Although this is more promising than existing transparent
theories, it obscures the difference between wanting and liking, and also does not fit
with research on the early childhood theory of mind - in particular, with the
competence very young children have in recognizing that different people have
different desires. I therefore conclude that transparency cannot be extended to
introspection for desires; the way in which we know our desires is very different to
the way we know what we believe.
1.0 Transparency
On transparent accounts of how we know our beliefs, we look to the world to find
out what we believe. As expressed by Evans:
In making a self ascription of belief, one's eyes are, so to speak, or
occasionally literally, directed outward - upon the world. If someone asks
me "Do you think there is going to be a third world war?," I must attend, in
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answering him, to precisely the same outward phenomena as I would attend
to if I were answering the question "Will there be a third world war?" (Evans
1982: 225) 49
Disentangling what it means for an account to be transparent is one thing that I hope
to accomplish in this chapter, although this will have to wait until later - for the
moment, a few general remarks about transparency will suffice.
There are a few advantages that a transparent model of introspection is supposed
to have. Firstly, it is supposedly economical - it does not require positing any
internal scanning mechanism, or any special faculty via which we know our mental
states, beyond what is needed for ordinary non-introspective knowledge. Take
belief, for example: if a transparent method for knowing my beliefs simply involves
looking to whether the content is true, then I do not need to use any special faculty
beyond what is needed to come to the belief itself.so
Moreover, this transparent method for knowing my beliefs explains why each of
us has a special sort of access to our own beliefs, and not to others'. I can reliably
infer from p that I believe p, whereas your inference from p to Lauren believes p would
not be reliable. In order for this second inference to be even somewhat reasonable,
you would have to have some reason beyond p itself for thinking that I would
believe p. On the other hand, even though p's being true does not raise the
49 There are some extra complications with Evans's way of characterizing transparency that I will
ignore for the purposes of this paper. For example, Evans's way of formulating the idea of a
transparent method makes it seems as if I can, in applying this method, gather new evidence.
But this isn't a method for knowing what my mental states are now. See (Gertler 2007) for this
sort of criticism. Also, my answers to the two questions will not quite line up. My answer to
"Will there be a third world war?" might be "I don't know", and thus my answer to "Do you
think there is going to be a third world war?" will be "No, I don't think that" (but not because I
think there won't be).
50 And, at least for some transparent accounts, the ability to infer from the belief that you have it.
The general ability to perform inferences is needed, of course, for non-introspective
knowledge.
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likelihood of it being the case that I believe p, my having the proposition p as part of
my apparent evidence entails that I already believe p, and thus ensures that the
inference from p to I believe that p, made by me, is reliable. 
51
But belief, of course, is just one of our mental states. I will look at whether we
can extend this idea to our knowledge of our desires, as has recently been
suggested. 52 I will presuppose that the distinctive method via which we know our
own beliefs is transparent. Given this, a transparent model of how we
introspectively know our desires can look very attractive. It would be a step
towards an integrated (i.e. that we have introspective access to our different mental
states in similar ways) and economical (we avoid positing special introspective
faculties) account of introspection.
1.1 Transparency for desires
In Evans' original description of a transparent method, he stresses the direction of
attention. My attention, in inquiring about my beliefs, is not on my beliefs as mental
states, but on their content. The same might seem prima facie plausible for other
mental states as well:
If asked whether I am happy or wishing that p, whether I prefer x to y,
whether I am angry at or afraid of z, and so on, my attention would be
directed at p, x and y, z, etc. (Bar-On 2004: 106).
If I am asked (by myself or others) whether I want p to be the case, my
51 Thus, it in fact explains two things: the fact that we have a very different sort of procedure via
which we know our own beliefs, and the fact that we have a high degree of justification for our
beliefs about our own beliefs (since the inference is highly reliable). See (Byrne 2005) for more
detailed discussion of this.
52 (Byrne 2005), (Byrne in preparation), (Fernandez 2007).
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attention will be directed at p being the case. To address the question, I do
not try to, so to speak, scan my own mind in search of a state that I can
identify as the relevant desire. Rather, I concern myself with the outside
world by focusing on the intentional object of the desire (Fernandez 2007:
524).
It depends what it takes for an account to be transparent whether what Bar-On and
Fernandez are describing is a transparent method for introspecting our desires. The
metaphor of transparency, if taken literally, involves seeing through the mental state
to its content.5ss But if transparency involves simply just looking to the content of
the mental state, then given that beliefs and desires may have the same content, and
that we have a transparent account for belief, we cannot have a transparent account
for desire - unless we are often confused about whether we believe or desire
something, or else always believe and desire the same things.
Alex Byrne points out that although the cases for belief and desire are not entirely
analogous, there is still something like transparency at play here:
... often my eyes are still "directed outward - upon the world." I can
investigate my preferences by attending to the beer and the wine... (Byrne
2005: 100) s4
53 As we will see later, Fernandez sometimes seems to think of transparency for belief as "seeing
through" the second-order question (of whether you have the mental state) to the first-order
question of whether the content is true - the way that Evans describes the transparent method
suggests this. However, when he states it explicitly, transparency for desire is: "focusing [your]
attention on the intentional object of the relevant desire" (Fernandez 2007: 525). Confusing
these two characterizations of transparency leads to problems, as we will see in section 2.
54 I presume, also, to what the world would be like if I drank the beer or what it would be like if I
drank the wine.
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Although the metaphor doesn't directly apply here, there is perhaps something
similar about the way via which we have introspective access to our beliefs and how
we introspectively access our desires. Although, in looking for whether I desire p, I
don't inquire whether p is the case, I seem to attend to p being the case - in
particular, to what the world would be like were p to be the case. When I form a
belief about my desires via introspection, my attention is content-directed.
However, the claim of transparency must go further than just the claim that our
attention is content-directed; our attention is not just content-directed, but it is also
not at all directed on our own mental states or behavior. Content directedness, as it
has to be understood to be part of an account of self-knowledge for desire, does not
itself entail that we don't also have some attention on these things. My attention
cannot just be on the content as such, but must be on some property or relation that
the content has to something, and this could be its relationship to my mental states
or behavior. Thus we can see transparency as involving two parts:
1) Transparency of the self In investigating my mental states, I do not attend
to my mental states or behavior, except insofar as these figure in the
content of the mental state.
2) Content-directedness: In order to investigate whether I have a mental state
with content p, I direct my attention (in thought) towards p being the
case.
As I mentioned before, insofar as there is a transparent method for knowing our
desires, transparency cannot require me to attend simply to whether p is the case. So
directing my attention towards p being the case does not mean that I am necessarily
looking to whether p is true. So what do we do, when we want to know our
desires? What do we do once our attention is focused on the object of potential
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desire?
Suppose you would like to know whether you want to go to the beach.
According to transparent accounts, if I want to know whether I want to go to the
beach, I don't look inwards, but consider the beach (or the activity of going to the
beach, or the state of affairs of my being at the beach). This doesn't need to involve
literally looking at the beach (I cannot see it, sadly, from where I am), but it does
involve attending to the beach as a non-mental item (though I do attend to it in
thought).
What features of (going to) the beach will I attend to? A common thing we do
when thinking about our options and what we want regarding them is to weigh the
pros and cons of each option. This is a way of attending to the aspects of an option
that make it a favourable or unfavourable thing to do. I will attend to features of the
activity of going to the beach, and ask whether, on balance, it is favourable. I will
attend to the likelihood of the beach being crowded, whether it is warm enough,
and perhaps the cost of getting there. If I find that things balance out in favour of
going to the beach, I conclude: yes, I do want to go.
I will ask whether going to the beach is a good option - whether it is desirable. So,
a potential transparent account of introspection for desires is that we know our
desires, in a first-personal way, via our judgments of value or desirability concerning
the object of the potential desire.
This is in fact what is suggested in two recent accounts, given by Jordi Fernandez
and Alex Byrne, which try to extend the idea of a transparent introspective method
to the case of desire.5ss However, any account that claims that something like
judgments of value is a way via which we know our desires faces pressure from two
55 See (Byrne 2005), (Byrne in preparation) and (Fernandez 2007). Byrne opts for judgments of
desirability; Fernandez opts for valuing, which he suggests should be understood as: believing that
the thing in question is right or good. He is, however, is open to the option that valuing something
might be understood in a different way.
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directions. Firstly, they will have to account for cases of valuing-free desiring - cases
where we seem to have first-personal access to our desires without judging that the
object of desire is valuable. For example, I don't seem to judge it desirable that I
sing in the shower, but yet I know that I want to - and I know this in some first-
personal way. Secondly, they will have to account for cases of desire-free valuing -
cases where we judge something valuable but seem to know (in a first-personal way)
that we don't desire it - as when I judge it desirable to exercise, but I know that I
don't want to.
To deal with desire-free valuing, one needs to specify conditions under which
the inference from value to desire is defeasible. I will argue that Byrne's suggestions
for a potential defeater, which he uses to account for desire-free valuing, in fact
requires foreknowledge of our desires in order to apply it. Thus, it is unsuitable to
play a role in an account of how we know our desires. I argue that the same is true
for other potential defeaters of similar types. I suspect that further candidate
defeaters will face similar problems.
Before getting to this, however, I will discuss the problem of valuing-free
desiring. If judgments of value are the only means via which we can know
introspectively that we desire something, then we cannot have this type of case;
value-centric accounts such as given by Byrne - ones that place value judgments at
centre-stage - will have to explain away cases where it seems that one knows, via
introspection, that one desires something - yet not on the basis of judging it
valuable. On the other hand, one could try to accommodate such cases, instead of
attempting to explain them away, and move to a plural access account, as Fernandez
does. This type of account requires positing some separate way via which we can
know our desires. Fernandez's account is however in danger of requiring some
special faculty of introspection in order to account for how we know our valuing-
free desires.
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2.0 Valuing-Free desires
There are many things that we know we want yet for which it may seem a stretch to
say that we value them. Do I really judge it valuable to have a cup of tea, or to have
another slice of cake? Yet I can still know, in a first-personal sort of way, that I
want these things - I can know that I want something, and yet fail to judge it
valuable. Furthermore, sometimes I knowingly want something which goes against
what I judge to be valuable - I might know that I want to have another drink when I
think that it would be much better not to. We can know that we want something
and yet be quite ashamed of this - we can think that the object of our desire is not a
worthy object. That is to say, we can know that we want something that we judge
not to be valuable.
One way to approach this problem is to give some further means via which we
access our desires. This is the approach taken by Fernandez. However, as I will
argue, his account does not end up having the advantages that transparent accounts
are claimed to have.
The alternate means via which Fernandez thinks that we know our desires is
through what he calls urges. These are supposed to be experiences like appetites,
cravings, yearnings, longings, and "experiences wherein a subject just feels like
doing something" (Fernandez 2007: 522). Urges are "states wherein we
experience the fact that we are not in some state as unpleasant" (Fernandez
2007: 522). s6 So, when I know that I want to have another drink, although I do
not judge this to be valuable - I will not be able to drive home, and I will feel
awful tomorrow - according to Fernandez, I know this on the basis of an urge to
56 Probably, urges should be defined more widely than this; I presume that Fernandez would think
that I know that I want to stay lying in the sun on the basis of this sort of ground - yet I am
already in the state of lying in the sun, so I am not having any experience of something as
unpleasant. Perhaps I experience the prospect of getting up as unpleasant - although it seems
that is needed really is that I experience the state that I am already in as pleasant.
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have another. Which is to say, I know this on the basis of the unpleasantness of
the experience of not having another.
By "on the basis of' here, Fernandez means:
Basing: S forms the belief that p on the basis of being in E, then
1) S believes that p because she is in E, and
2) S is disposed to believe that she is in E, should she reflect on why she
believes that p and provided she has the necessary concepts (Fernandez
2007: 521).
So S may form the belief that p on the basis of being in E without judging that she
is in E (if E simply causes her to believe that p), but she should be able to judge
that she was in E, and this is why she believes that p. 7 This judgment, however,
is not how she comes to believe that p.
I presume that the second condition has added to the definition of basing
because Fernandez is particularly interested in self-knowledge, and thus the
justification of our beliefs about our mental states. It seems to me to not be a
necessary part of the particular method via which we simply form beliefs about
our mental states, thought of as simply a procedure. Thus, for my purposes here,
I will ignore this part of Fernandez's account. I will, however, go on to consider
an account similar to Fernandez's that claims that introspection involves
inference from judgments concerning whether we are in a state that causes the
mental state in question. Some of what I say about this alternative account will,
however, also raise concerns for the claim that Fernandez's own account (when
we add back the second condition) is economical.
57 I am not here intending to make any claims about the connection between dispositions and
ability - this is my interpretation of what Fernandez means.
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Before this, I will look at Fernandez's claim that introspection for desires
(ignoring the conditions required for a particular introspective belief to be
justified) involves simply being caused to believe that you have the desire, by the
very state that causes that desire. The problem here is that this brute causal
connection looks very much like positing a special mechanism via which we
know what we desire. Although the brute causal connection is not directly
between the desire and the belief that one has the desire, it is a connection that is
not required for the explanation of anything other than how we know our
desires." Thus, Fernandez has not given us an economical account.
One way to fix this particular problem would be to claim instead that
introspective beliefs about valuing-free desires are formed via inference from
judgments about our urges. Then there would not be any mysterious causal
connection directly between the urge itself and the belief that we have the
corresponding desire. The general ability to perform inferences is already needed
to give an account of the mind in any case; even though inference might be a causal
process, it would not be a mysterious link between the two states. Call the
hypothetical philosopher who holds this view, "Fernandez*". Fernandez*, although
he evades the claim that his account is non-economical due to positing a mysterious
causal connection between our urges and introspective beliefs about our desires, it
is non-economical for another reason. Without a transparent account of how we
come to our judgments about our urges, his account is still non-economical - it
requires that we have some way to detect our urges that is not required for non-
introspective knowledge.
I will now consider a potential reply to this on Fernandez*'s behalf. If we can
58 Although Fernandez's account does not require a special sense that uses a sensory organ as does
our sense of sight, the mere positing of a brute causal connection between mental states and
beliefs about them is enough to count as giving a non-economical account. See (Shoemaker
1994), (Byrne 2005: 86)
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supplement his account with a transparent method for knowing our urges, then we
can alleviate the need to posit a special faculty of introspection for our knowledge of
urges, and thus for our knowledge of a class of our desires. However, as I will
argue, the most promising candidate for a economical account of our epistemic
access to our urges does not turn out to be transparent or economical.
Since urges are supposed to include states like being hungry, you might think that
we can give a transparent epistemology via an appeal to bodily sensations, which
would perhaps be known via one's proprioceptive sense. This would not be
positing a special introspective faculty, as proprioception is required to account for
the fact that we can know non-mental facts like the position of our limbs - for
example, whether your own legs are crossed - without observation through our
other senses. Just because the sensations appealed to are internal does not make the
method non-economical.
So perhaps I know that I feel hungry via feeling a disturbance in my stomach, I
know that I have an urge to stop running via feeling a heaviness in my legs and lungs,
and perhaps I know that I have an urge to jump with excitement via feeling a
readiness to spring upwards in my limbs. Since each of these potential ways of
knowing my urges appeals to bodily sensations, and not to the existence of mental
states, it looks as if Fernandez might be able to give an economical account after all.
However, this is not the case. Urges are not merely bodily sensations. They are
experiences offinding these bodily sensations pleasant or unpleasant. It appears to
be a further fact whether a particular sensation is pleasant or unpleasant - the very
same sensation can be experienced as being pleasant, neutral or unpleasant. For
most of us, hunger is an unpleasant sensation, but it might be experienced by the
anorectic as a pleasantly hollow feeling in her stomach. Similarly pain is usually
unpleasant for most of us, but the masochist feels at least some types of pain as
erotic and not unpleasant. Moreover, whether the sensation results in a desire to
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alleviate the feeling (or to make it continue) is better tracked by whether the
sensation is felt as unpleasant (or pleasant) than by whether the person feels the
sensation itself.
In sum, if we are looking for an account of introspection for desires that is
economical then one which appeals to urges, as Fernandez and Fernandez*'s
accounts do, does not look promising. What we do have are accounts that explain
how we know our desires without scanning our mind directly for the desire; we do
"look past" the desire to something else. s But given that, for cases of valuing-free
desires, the something else that we look to is a mental state, which we presumably
know about first-personally, neither Fernandez nor Fernandez* have alleviated the
need to posit a special introspective faculty.
2.1 Fernandez and Transparency
Given all this, it is worth taking a minute here to explain why Fernandez thinks that
this account of introspection for desires is transparent and economical. To do this,
we should look at his general account of introspection, for belief, desire, and
perceptual experiences. According to Fernandez, my introspective beliefs about my
mental states are caused by my being in some other state that reliably causes the
mental state in question. 60
So how is this method transparent? Fernandez defines a transparent method for
desire as one where you answer the question whether you desire something by
"focusing [your] attention on the intentional object of the relevant desire"
59 However, whether the thing is thought to be pleasant or unpleasant is often thought to be part
of what it is to desire something. If this is the case, then Fernandez's account would be a direct
scanning account.
60 Actually, for perception, it is the perceptual experience itself that causes us to believe that we
have it - so the more precise gloss would be: my introspective belief that I am in mental state M
is caused by my being in some state E such that I tend to have M when I am in E. M and E may
be the same state; if not, E is a reliable cause of M.
PAGE 72 OF 95
--- 7i;- .-. .~ . ..i. -l-."..~"I~CI-~."l...l~^'l. -7--i
(Fernandez 2007: 525). Call the state that both reliably causes some mental state M
and also causes you to believe that you are in M, "E". Fernandez does not claim that
E is the state of attending to the intentional object of M, which is what seems to be
needed to meet his own definition for a transparent method. It does not follow
simply from the fact that I am looking for 61 whether I am in a state that reliably
causes a particular desire that I am looking to the intentional object of desire. It does
not even follow that I have to have the intentional object of the desire in mind as I
look - I might simply look to my urges in order to find out what it is that I have
urges for. It is a further claim that to do this I must have in mind a particular object
or state of affairs in order to find out what I want. So Fernandez's account of
introspection for desire is not definitively transparent.
It will be enlightening to look at Fernandez's account of self-knowledge for
another kind of state: for belief. This will uncover the reason that he mistakenly
thinks that his account for desire is transparent.
In giving his gloss on transparency in his earlier paper on introspection for
belief, he says, "Beliefs are 'transparent' in the sense that if I want to know
whether I believe that a certain event is the case, what I do is look for evidence
that indicates whether the event in question obtains." (Fernandez 2003: 355).
This (apparent) evidence - other beliefs and possibly perceptual experiences -
are, on his view, causes of the belief. So for this version of transparency, when I
want to know whether I believe that p, I look to whether I am in states that
would be causes of the belief that p.
Because one's attention is directed towards the same considerations in forming
both the first order and second order belief, this loosely fits with Evans's
characterisation of a transparent introspective method - that of getting myself "in a
61 Strictly speaking, it does not seem that I need to look at all, if this belief is simply caused in me
by my being in the state that reliably causes the desire.
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position to answer the question whether I believe that p by putting into operation
whatever procedure I have for answering the question whether p." (Evans 1982:
225). Adapted for the case of desire, this will mean that in order to answer the
question whether I desire that p, I put into operation whatever procedure I have for
coming to the desire that p.
Fernandez has then, in his later work, extended this general framework to
introspection of our desires. Thus, he thinks that we look to whether we are in
states that would reliably cause a particular desire in order to find out whether
we have that desire. These states are also then the cause of our belief that we
have that desire - and they act as apparent evidence for our having that desire:
... the support I have for my belief that I desire to do something is identical to
my grounds62 for that desire. It is no wonder, then, that to address the
question of whether I have the desire to do something, I attend to my
grounds for wanting to do it. I am simply looking for adequate support for
my self-ascription (Fernandez 2007: 525).63
Now, where the causes that one looks to - for introspection of beliefs, other
beliefs and perceptual experiences - are themselves known via a method that is
outward-looking and transparent to the self, we end up with a procedure that is
itself outward-looking and transparent to the self. 64 However, where the causes
62 Recall that E constitutes grounds for D in S when S tends to have D when she is in E (Fernandez
2007: 521).
63 This quotation, because it talks of forming the introspective belief via looking for evidence and not
simply being caused to believe you have the desire in question, suggests that Fernandez may in
fact hold the view of Fernandez*, although this is not the view that he officially endorses.
64 It is not entirely clear that it is economical, however - while for knowledge of many beliefs it
will be, his account for perceptual belief- beliefs based solely on perceptual experiences - seems
to require the positing of a brute causal connection between the perception and the belief that
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that one looks to are not themselves known by an outward-looking and self-
transparent method, such as when one looks to urges in the introspection of
one's valuing-free desires, then looking to the causes of a mental state will not
yield a transparent method.
A brief discussion of his view of how we have introspective access to our
perceptual experiences will reveal why he thinks that he has given an economical
account of introspection for desire. According to his view, we are caused to
believe that we have a perceptual experience directly by the perceptual
experience itself, not in virtue of the beliefs that arise from having the perceptual
experience. Thus, there is simply a brute causal connection between the
perception and the belief that you are having it - a connection that is not needed
to account for any non-introspective knowledge. However, he thinks that this
account is economical because he has not needed to posit any extra states, in
order to explain how we know what perceptual experiences we are having, that
we have not posited already to account for perceptual experience itself. Which
is true - the only state involved in my coming to believe that I am having an
experience as of a chocolate croissant being in front of me is the state of having a
perceptual experience as of the chocolate croissant - which is already required in
order to explain how I come to the non-introspective belief that there is a
chocolate croissant in front of me.
you have the perception. This extra causal connection not required for ordinary non-perceptual
knowledge. Fernandez points out that his account does not require positing any special
experiences that are not required to explain ordinary perceptual knowledge, but this is not
enough to get an economical account. Byrne's account, to contrast, has it that you form the
belief that you have a perceptual experience in virtue of the perceptual belief, not directly in
virtue of the perception itself. Thus it requires a general capacity for inference, and the causal
connection that is already needed between the perception and the perceptual belief.
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2.2 Explaining Away Valuing-Free Desires?
I will now turn to a second kind of supposedly transparent account, proposed by
Alex Byrne, which tries to account for our first-personal epistemic access to our
desires through one central method: judgments of value. Instead of trying to
account for valuing-free desires, Byrne claims that there are no such things -
whenever we know that we want something, we know because we judge that thing
to be valuable.
This idea can be made more plausible by noting that there is a sense of "valuable"
which does not imply that the thing is very important.6 5 Although I don't think that
having a slice of cake or tea is particularly important, the cake might be valuable in
the sense that it is delicious, and the tea might be valuable in the sense that it is
warming. Byrne's account also requires an idea of valuing that does not imply that
the thing is all-things-considered valuable, since we can have conflicting desires -
we can know that we desire something, even if it is not judged to be all-things-
considered the most valuable option. I can know thatI want the cake (because I
judge it valuable in the deliciousness sense), although all-things-considered I judge it
better to refrain from having it.
This sense of "valuable", however, is not supposed to be so permissive that it
applies to anything that has some consideration in favor of it. Almost any action can
be thought of as having some consideration in favor of it - the burning of precious
family photo albums, for example, would provide me with a small amount of heat
to get through the winter. But even when I judge that this is a consideration in favor
of burning the albums, I do not judge that I desire to do so - even though I
recognize that there is at least something to be said for doing it. 66
65 Given Fernandez's examples of valuing (valuing being a good parent, valuing being a musician),
I assume he thinks that valuing requires thinking important.
66 Furthermore, you might hold that in some situations there can be no available option that I want
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A simple value-centric account, when it uses this sense of "valuable", can deal
with cases of known conflicting desires, such as when I know I both desire the cake
and desire to refrain from it. Here I simply judge both to be valuable, but in
different respects. The account, however, needs also to be able to deal with cases
where we judge that something is valuable, yet we somehow know - in a first-
personal way - that we don't want it, such as when I judge it desirable to refrain
from eating the cake but also know that I don't want to refrain - cases of desire-free
valuing.
Fernandez's account also faces the problem of desire-free valuing, but he gives us
no idea of how we know that we do not desire something though we judge it
valuable. This is despite recognising that our values and our desires do sometimes
come apart 67 - and presumably also that we can know this introspectively.
However, in the following section I will begin by focusing on Byrne's account since
he does give us some idea of how we might deal with desire-free valuing, but after
this I will also discuss ways in which Fernandez's account might be able to be
extended.
3.0 Desire-Free Valuing
Sometimes, although I judge some activity valuable, I know I don't want to do it. I
know I really should get out of bed when my alarm rings in the morning, but I just
don't feel like it - I know that I just don't want to. I often judge that the healthy
option on the menu is good for me - that it is valuable in the respect that it is
healthy - yet know that I don't want it. If the means via which we know our desires
to take - since all options are bad ones. Perhaps my options are that either you will shot me, or
I can play Russian roulette with myself. In this case, perhaps, I judge that I don't desire any of
the available options, even though one option (in this case, playing Russian roulette) might have
something to be said for it - it might be the least bad of the available options.
67 See (Fernandez: 523).
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involves inference from judgments of value, this value-to-desire inference must be
defeasible. 68
Note that in these cases, my belief that I don't have a certain desire is arrived at in
a particularly first-personal way. Thus the defeater in question must be also known
in a first-personal way. 69 Of course there could also be other third-personal
defeaters for the value to desire inference that explain how I know that I don't want
something which I value. I may sometimes take observations of my own behavior to
defeat this inference. Perhaps, although I believe that it is desirable to eat healthily,
reflection on my eating habits might cause me to reconsider the move from this to
the judgment that I desire to. But this sort of defeater is quite different to the ones I
will consider here.
Suppose you judge that some activity, phi-ing, is valuable, but yet know you
don't desire to phi - and you know you lack this desire in some first-personal way.
According to Byrne, there is some defeating consideration that blocks the inference
from your judgment that phi-ing is valuable to the judgment that you desire to phi.
What might such a first-personal defeater look like? Byrne suggests:
Desire Defeater: If you intend to psi (where phi-ing and psi-ing are believed
incompatible) and you judge that psi-ing is not desirable, believe that you
don't desire to phi. 70
68 Here I am interested in defeaters in the sense that they stop you from believing that you have the
desire in question. One might also be interested in defeaters as mere justification-removers, if
the particular interest was in introspective knowledge, rather than just introspection.
69 Even though there might be defeaters that are not known in a first-personal way, this does not
undermine the claim that knowledge of when I do have desires is sometimes first-personal. In
order to know that I have a desire, on this supposition, it needn't be the case that I appeal to
there being no third-personal defeaters. Casullo (2003) makes a similar point about defeaters
when considering a priori knowledge - you might arrive at a belief via methods that count as a
priori, even though there are potential defeaters that are a posteriori.
70 Note that this defeater appeals to mental evidence. If, however, there can be a transparent
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Take the case where I believe that it is desirable to get up off the couch and get
some exercise, yet know I don't want to. I intend to stay lying on the couch,
though I judge that undesirable. According to Desire Defeater, because I recognitze
that I intend to take the undesirable option of remaining on the couch, I will judge
that I don't desire to exercise. So where you recognise that you intend to take some
other undesirable, and incompatible (psi-ing may just be not phi-ing), option, you
should not infer from your judging phi-ing valuable to your desiring to phi.
3.1 The Problem of the Sleepy Student
To see the problems with using Desire Defeater to account for cases of accidie,
consider this case:
Desiree Desiree, a sleepy student, judges it desirable to go to lecture, but
judges that she does not want to. She also, however, judges that staying in
bed is desirable - the bed is warm, comfortable, and staying there takes less
effort than getting up. Desire Defeater does not apply because the option she
intends to take is judged desirable.
To explain Desiree's case we also need afurther defeater to explain how she knows
that she doesn't want to go to lecture. Perhaps, though, we can give a defeater in
the spirit of Desire Defeater:
Desiree's Defeater: If you intend to psi (where phi-ing and psi-ing are believed
incompatible) and you judge that psi-ing is less desirable than phi-ing, believe
that you don't desire to phi.
account of how we know our intentions, this suggested method via which we introspectively
know our desires might still be economical.
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If Desiree applied this defeater, this would explain her concluding that she doesn't
want to go to lecture. But I want to point out two preliminary problems with this
move. 7 Firstly, D'siree need not judge that staying in bed is less desirable than
going to lecture. Even if she judges that staying in bed is more desirable than going
to lecture, she still has a case of her value judgments and her desire judgments
coming apart. If we can have (known) conflicting desires, we cannot claim that she
would know that she doesn't want to go to lecture merely because it is judged less
desirable than staying in bed.
Secondly, there will be cases where Ddsire's Defeater gets the wrong answer. 72
Sometimes one intends to take the path judged less desirable yet does desire the thing
judged most desirable - just not enough to overwhelm the desire to take the less
desirable option. Maybe I really do want to exercise, but just not enough to
overwhelm the appeal of the comfortable couch. This leads us to a more general
problem -that of how you know the strength of your desires.
3.2 Introspecting Desire Strength
According to our commonsense view of the mind, desires can be of varying
strengths. My desire for an Eames chair is not as strong as my desire for a holiday,
which is in turn not as strong as my desire to live in an amazing loft apartment.
Presumably I also know the strength of these and other desires via introspection, so
Byrne's account needs some supplementation.
A natural thought might be that, in ordinary cases, you judge that you desire
71 I will postpone discussion of what I think is the biggest problem with this type of defeater until
section 3.3.
72 Although this doesn't mean that Ddsirie's Defeater cannot be part of the account, it does mean
that there will need to be a defeater for this defeater, to account for the cases where applying it
would get the wrong answer. Once we add defeaters for defeaters, however, the account is in
danger of being so complicated that it is not believable that this is a description of the method
that we go through in looking for what we desire.
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something to the degree that you judge it valuable,7 3 though this too must be
defeasible, if we are to accommodate cases where your relative desire strengths do
not match up with how valuable you judge the different options. I might judge
getting up to be more valuable than remaining lying in bed, and judge that I want
both, but my laziness results in my wanting to stay in bed more than I want to get up.
With this type of case, the option that I judge the most desirable is just not desired
enough to move me to action. This may be because it is not desired at all (which are
the cases of desire-free valuing that Byrne introduced Desire Defeater to handle), or
because it is simply desired less than some other option (which is itself judged to be
the less desirable option). While for this second sort of case, Byrne's account gets
the right result on the existence of desires (as this kind of case does not require a
defeater like Desire Defeater - since both option are desired), it is completely silent
on how we know how much we desire something. This is particularly pressing for
cases where our desire strengths don't match up with how desirable we judge the
options to be. In this section I will consider how to supplement Byrne's account to
deal with this.
Take a case where you desire both to phi and to psi; normally (according to the
view being considered), you will judge that you desire to phi and psi to the degree
you judge them valuable. However, there will be times where this is not the case,
and so again we need a defeater. A possible defeater could be:
Strength Defeater If you intend to psi (where phi-ing and psi-ing are believed
incompatible) and you judge that psi-ing is less desirable than phi-ing, believe
that you desire to psi more than you desire to phi.
74
73 Suggested by Alex Byrne, in conversation.
74 I will assume that we only have access to the relative strengths of our desires. If, however, we
can know our desire strengths more fine-grainedly than this, that will be a further problem for
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Perhaps I judge both the burger and the salad to be valuable in their own ways (the
greasy burger may be delicious, while the bland iceberg lettuce salad might be
healthier for me). Suppose also that I judge the salad to be more valuable, but know
that I intend to have the burger. If I apply Strength Defeater, I will know that I desire
the burger more because I intend to have it.
3.3 Intention and Foreknowledge of Desire
However, the major problem with all of these proposed defeaters is this: I often
know the strengths of my desires, and what I desire, before I know what I intend -
and so at best there will be many cases that aren't covered by these defeaters. I
usually take how much I want something, or whether I want it, into account when
deciding what to do.75 Consider another sleepy student:
Nodesiree Nodesiree doesn't see staying in bed as desirable, and furthermore
intends to stay in bed. Thus Desire Defeater does apply. However, Nod&sir6e
need not form an intention to stay in bed in order to know that she doesn't
want to go - the fact that she doesn't want to go is part of what she considers
when deciding whether to intend to go or to stay in bed. "Shall I go to the
lecture?" she thinks, "...hmmm...it would be best, but I just don't want
to...so I'm not going to go!".
The main problem that this sleepy student poses for Byrne's account is that he
cannot explain how she knows about her lack of desire - the account still needs a
further defeater to take account of the fact that although she judges going to lecture
this type of account.
75 This objection also causes problems for accounts like Moran's (2001), where desires are known
via practical decisions. For Moran, the question of "what do I want?" is equivalent to the
question, "what should I do?". But if knowledge of desires comes prior to decision-making,
then there will be desires that are not known via a decision concerning what to do.
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desirable, she still knows that she doesn't want to go. Like many of us in this type
of situation, Nodesir'e knows that she doesn't want to go to lecture before she
intends anything - she takes her lack of desire as a consideration when deciding
whether to go. Because of this, her judgment about her intention to stay in bed
cannot figure in a defeating condition designed to explain how she knows that she
doesn't want to go to lecture.
So appealing to intentions in these kind of defeaters will not work because we
sometimes (in fact, I think, often) have epistemic access to our desires (and their
strengths) before we know what we intend. We often decide what to do - what we
intend to do - partly on the basis of how much we want to do it.
This is not necessarily to say that desires are always epistemically prior to
intentions. Sometimes we "try on" intentions in order to work out what we want. I
might form the intention to order the burger in order to find out how I feel about
ordering the burger. The pangs of guilt for not ordering the healthy option might
just be too strong, which then leads me to conclude that I prefer to order the salad.
Given that we might sometimes use our intentions in this way to find out about our
desires and lack of them, it may seem that intention-based defeaters could still be
part of the story about how our we know our desires, even though we will need
further defeaters to cover the majority of cases.
However, I think it is questionable whether these defeaters are ever the method
via which we know our lack of desires, even where I know my intentions prior to
knowing about my desires. Where I "try on" an intention in situations like this, it is
not the intention as such (or judgment that I so intend) that leads me to conclude
that I want one option more than the other - in this case, that I want the salad more
than the burger. It is instead how Ifeel about my choice.
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3.4 Further Possible Defeaters
Here I want to consider whether we could find some other defeaters that do not
appeal to judgments of what you intend. Here I will focus on Fernandez's account.
Fernandez claims that there is a reliable connection between my valuing something
and my desiring it, in normal conditions. In non-normal conditions, the connection is
not reliable - and thus, perhaps, a belief that I am not in normal conditions could
work as a defeater. Some non-normal conditions are ones where desire-free valuing
often occurs - for example, depression:
Suppose, for instance, that you are deeply depressed. Then, it may be the
case that you find a certain goal valuable but, nevertheless, you do not desire
to pursue it (Fernandez 2007: 523).
So, perhaps, sometimes we know that we don't desire to pursue a goal that we
value in virtue of knowing that we are depressed - perhaps the belief that we are
depressed is a defeater for the inference from something being valuable to our
desiring it.
However, again it appears to me that the epistemology is around the wrong way
- usually we know what that we lack desires before we know that we are depressed.
Often when someone knows that they are depressed, this is because they stop
desiring things that they value. My judgment that I am depressed is based on my
value judgments and my desires coming apart. This does not mean that we cannot
appeal to depression in the antecedent of a defeater, but it does mean that there are
many cases where depression cannot function as a defeater for value to desire
inferences.
Ultimately, appealing to depression does not get us a defeater that can be part of
a transparent account. Either I know that I am depressed via already knowing my
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desires and values come apart, or I know that I am depressed because I stop finding
pleasant the things that I normally would enjoy. But this requires knowledge of what
I find pleasant and so has the same problems that I pointed out in the discussion of
urges in section 2. So for the cases where I know I am depressed prior to knowing
that my values and desires come apart, I know this non-transparently - by looking
to how Ifeel.
So both Byrne and Fernandez are left without an account of most cases where we
know that we don't want something even though we judge it valuable. Fernandez
gives no account at all; Byrne might be able to account for some cases, but only very
few. Furthermore, neither account deals with how we know how much we desire
something.
In the following section, I will discuss a potential transparent account of our
introspective knowledge of desires that gives up on judgments of value, in favour of
appearances of value. Cases of desire-free valuing, then, can be explained as ones
where you fail to perceive the value in the object or activity, but yet you believe, on
some other basis, that it is valuable. Valuing-free desiring can be explained as cases
where you seem to perceive value, but you do not come to believe that the object of
desire is valuable, for some reason or another. The account allows for a
straightforward correspondence between the degree to which something appears to
be valuable, and the degree to which it is thought to be desired. Thus, this account
fairs much better than one based on judgments of value, but there remains a lot to be
explained: for example, it seems difficult to account for the difference between
wanting and liking, which needs to appeal to some felt motivational force, and so
cannot be explained in a transparent manner. It also does not fit with results from
early childhood theory of mind research. In the end, I think, we do not find out
what we want by merely looking outwards.
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4.0 The Projective Account
We often know our desires before we know our intentions; similarly, we often
know that we lack desires before we know whether we are depressed or not. So
appealing to these states will not help us in explaining how we know that we don't
desire something that we value. Byrne's account, as it stands, could not take
account of many cases where we judge something desirable but know we fail to
desire it, or of how we know, when our desire strengths don't match up with how
valuable we think the options are, how much we want something. Perhaps,
however, there is some other way to give a value-centric account that does not have
these problems?
Considering depression will lead us into a more promising transparent account
of introspective knowledge of desire. People often describe depression as making
things gray - it is as if the attractiveness and value has been stripped from the
world. The things in the world appear to have lost some desire-independent
property. On the other hand, the alleviation of depression makes things "brighter",
and value appears to have returned to the world. This is strikingly seen in reports of
severely depressed individuals who have their depression lifted by deep brain
stimulation:
All patients spontaneously reported acute effects including "sudden calmness
or lightness," "disappearance of the void," sense of heightened awareness,
increased interest, "connectedness," and sudden brightening of the room,
including a sharpening of visual details and intensification of colors in
response to electrical stimulation (Mayberg et al. 2005: 652).
In this section I will explore the possibility of using the idea found in such reports to
develop a type of transparent account whereby we know our desires via appearances
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of value. Ultimately, I do not think this account works, but I do think it fares better
than Byrne and Fernandez's account with cases of both valuing-free desires and
desire-free valuing, and in accounting for how we know the strength of our desires.
I think that the problem with taking inference from judgments of desirability or
value as the method via which we know our desires stems from the fact that there
are several different ways in which we can end up with a belief that something is
desirable - and it is generally the way in which we come to this belief, and how that
belief is sustained, that affects the reliablity of the inference from value to desire.
One way in which we come to believe something is desirable or valuable is via
testimony. You might tell me that the sushi at this restaurant is good; my dentist
might tell me that flossing is desirable. When I come to believe that things are
valuable on the basis of testimony, often I also then come to desire them. But not
always. This is what I think happens in some cases of desire-free valuing - I come to
believe that something is valuable but this fails for some reason to generate in me
the appropriate desire.
Now, we don't always come to believe that something is valuable because others
tell us - sometimes we can come to this belief through first-personal means. When
we do, I suggest, this is because the thing appears to be valuable (and because we
have no reasons to think it isn't). This is not the same as judging the thing to be
valuable, as we can come to such judgments without the thing appearing to us to be
valuable. Moreover, I suggest, we can have things appear valuable or desirable to
us, although we do not end up judging them to be so.
When you have a case of desire-free valuing, on this view, you have either come
to believe that something is desirable through outside sources, although you do not
see the thing as desirable - or else you once saw the thing as desirable and have
retained a memory of that (and judge that the value of the thing has not changed),
although the thing now no longer appears to you to be desirable. I might believe that
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eating healthily is valuable because my doctor told me, yet have no desire to do so; I
might believe that continuing my once-favourite hobby is valuable, although for the
moment it seems to have lost its lustre.
Similarly, valuing-free desiring can be accounted for as cases where we see
something as desirable yet do not believe it to be so, perhaps because we have
competing evidence that such things are not desirable. Another glass of wine might
look attractive to me, but I may believe that having it would not be good at all
because I have evidence that having more would be a bad idea - and so, although I
know that I want it (because it appears desirable), this is not because I judge it
valuable.
The idea behind this account is, roughly, that when looking out to the world (in
thought or in cases of actually looking) things appear to us to be desirable. In the
same way that the chocolate cake looks brown, it also looks tasty (thus desirable in
the tastiness sense). Yet the account is transparent because our attention is on the
object of desire, and not to our own mental states. On this account, these
appearances seem to attribute non-relational properties to the object in question -
yet we have learned that these properties are not always objective (I want the
chocolate cake, you might not) and so we don't necessarily believe that the object
.1 J
has the non-relational attractiveness that it appears to.
On the projective account, it is in seeing the thing as desirable that I have access to
whether I desire it; it is on the basis of this sort of evidence gathering that I form
beliefs about my desires. Thus it is not on the basis of my desirability judgments that
I believe that I desire something - but in virtue of the evidence on which I base a
certain class of desirability judgments. Only in a certain subset of cases where I
judge some option desirable will I believe that I desire it - those in which the object
of desire also appears to me to be desirable.
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4.1 Evaluating the Projective Account
This outwardly focused account still misses something. As mentioned in chapter 2,
there is a difference between wanting something and merely liking it. People may
show all the signs of liking something, yet have no motivation to get it - and vice
versa. Appearances of desirability or value seem to fit better with judgments of what
one likes than what one feels motivation to get. To know what one is motivated to
get one has to look inwards, to an inner push or pull. The Mona Lisa may appear to
me to be valuable, yet I might feel no motivation towards getting it. It does not
seem here that it is right to say that I want the Mona Lisa, although I do like it.
Moreover, even if liking something were enough to entail that I have the desire for it,
there would still be some fact - that I feel motivated to satisfy the desire - which is
known first-personally and is not dealt with by the projective account.
But perhaps you might think that this is too quick - perhaps I would believe
that I am motivated to get the Mona Lisa if my doing things to obtain the Mona Lisa
appeared to me to be valuable. So, this reply concludes, appearances of value both
entails that I desire the thing in question, and explains how I know I am motivated
to satisfy that desire.
Yet it still seems that something is lacking. It seems perfectly possible that my
doing things to obtain the Mona Lisa appears to me to be valuable, yet I feel no
motivation to go through with it. Activities may appear valuable without your
feeling any motivation to engage in them. If motivation and liking are realized by
different physical systems, as is suggested by Berridge (2004) and Robinson and
Berridge (1998), then it is possible to not feel motivated to do the very thing that
appears to you to be valuable, even where the appearance concerns an activity. This
is a threat to the projective account if, as seems likely, people with decoupled liking
and motivational systems would know (first-personally) that they lack motivation for
things they like.
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This account also faces a challenge from experiments on early childhood theory
of mind. If we inferred what we want from appearances of desirability, such that
those appearances seemed to be desire-independent objective properties of the
desire's object, we would expect children to often make mistakes and attribute their
own desires to others. Yet at roughly the same age that they start talking about
desire, they recognize that different people want different things. This is in contrast
to their talk of belief, where they often attribute their own beliefs to others.
If their introspective access to their own beliefs were transparent, we would
expect it to be easy for children to make the mistake of attributing their own beliefs
to others. If they generally look past themselves, and past their mental states, to the
world, then it is plausible that they might find it initially difficult to attribute beliefs
that they do not hold to others.76 And this happens - young children have been
found to not attribute beliefs that they know to be false to someone else, even if it
seems that they have very good reason to think that the other person would have a
false belief. Contrasting their own beliefs with those of others typically does not
come until after age 3. Yet they are quicker to realize that different people want
different things, 77 which suggests that they don't come to beliefs about their desires
via appearances of desirability that seem to be objective properties of the desired
76 If knowledge of one's own beliefs is transparent to the world in the way it is thought to be, then
we would expect it to be difficult to gain a conception of believing that does not simply collapse
to being true. This means that the initial concept of believing would be objective, so that someone
with this conception would mistakenly attribute their beliefs to others.
77 See (Bartsch and Wellman 1995). Subjective contrastives (talk that shows that the child
recognizes that a mental state is subjective) for desire precede subjective contrastives for belief
(Bartsch and Wellman 1995: 100). They also say that young children understand that
"...desires are experienced by persons, and persons have differing desires. In our data young
children certainly do not presume that desires are shared by all and sundry, nor do they
egocentrically think only of their own desires without recognition of the conflicting desires of
others. To the contrary, discussing recognized conflicts over desires is common in the speech
of quite young children" (Bartsch and Wellman 1995: 83-85). This comes at around age 2 1/2.
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5.0 Conclusion
To be transparent, a method for knowing our mental states must be, at least,
outward-looking and ignore the self (except insofar as the self figures in the content
of the mental state). Although Byrne's value-centric account fits this
characterization, it requires defeaters to account for cases of desire-free valuing.
Byrne's own candidate defeater gets the epistemology of intention and desire
around the wrong way, and does not in any case cover all cases of desire-free
valuing, nor does it explain how we know the strengths of our desires. I suggested
several further defeaters to try to solve these problems, but ultimately the problem
with all the defeaters considered is that it is via knowing our desires that we know
we are in the defeater's antecedent conditions, thus making these defeaters
unsuitable to play a part in an account of how we have first-personal access to our
desires.
Fernandez, on the other hand, gives us no account of how we know that we
don't desire something that we value. He does, however, try to account for cases of
valuing-free desiring by appealing to what he calls our urges - experiences of finding
the lack of some object (or non-obtaining of some state of affairs) unpleasant. This
presents Fernandez with a dilemma: if the access to desires is through inferences
from judgments about our urges, then his account needs to be supplemented with a
transparent means via which we know our urges in order to maintain the claim to
economy. On the other hand, if (as he seems to suggest) we are simply caused to
have beliefs about our desires by merely having the urge, then this account ends up
78 "An objective misconstrual would view desirability as inherent in the object, not subjects; the
intentional object of mental states are simply desirable (or not) in themselves, and hence
experienced similarly by all who encounter them" (Bartsch and Wellman 1995: 85). They do
not see this confusion in young children's talk about desires.
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positing a causal connection between a mental state and our beliefs about mental
states that is not required for our knowledge of the non-mental world. This means
that his account is not economical.
While the projective account is more promising than an account based on
judgments, it is similarly non-economical. It does, however, deal with both desire-
free valuing and valuing-free desiring by a method that is the same for all first-
personal access to our desires (like Byrne's, but unlike Fernandez's), and without
the need to posit a method that requires our applying defeaters. It also faces
empirical challenges from experiments where liking and motivation are dissociated,
and from work on early childhood theory of mind.
I suggest that we generally know what we desire via looking, in thought, to the
intentional object of the desire - but we also look to how we feel about it. This
requires us to keep one eye on ourselves and on our mental states. So we do not
know our desires via a transparent introspective method.
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